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THE PROCEDURAL IMPACT OF WEINBERGER V.
SALFI REVISITED
Steven Mark Goldstein*
The struggle to balance the federal budget has focused increased attention
on what are commonly referred to as the entitlement programs. In particular,
the Social Security program has become the subject of heated political debate.
Leaders of both major political parties and the President have agreed that
if the Social Security system is to remain solvent, changes must be made.
They have been unable, however, to reach any consensus on appropriate
changes. Notwithstanding this lack of consensus, one fact is clear. It is in-
evitable that any major changes affecting benefits or beneficiaries in the Social
Security program will be challenged in the federal courts, most likely in class
oriented litigation. This Article will focus on the procedural obstacles to such
federal litigation. Further, as will be explored, since these obstacles are also
of relevance to litigation involving the related Medicare and Supplemental
Security Income Programs (S.S.I.),' the impact of these obstacles on federal
litigation involving these programs will also be addressed.
Class oriented federal litigation involving the Social Security, Medicare,
or S.S.I. programs is likely to take the form of either: (1) constitutional
challenges to provisions of the Social Security, Medicare, or S.S.I. legisla-
tion; or (2) constitutional or federal statutory challenges to the regulations
promulgated to implement the legislation establishing these entitlement pro-
grams. Many of the procedural barriers to such litigation involving the Social
Security programs were addressed by the United States Supreme Court in
Weinberger v. Salfi.2 The Salfi decision, however, left many questions
unanswered. This Article will first identify the questions and related pro-
cedural concerns addressed by Salfi. It will then determine whether any of
these questions have been resolved. For those that have not, this Article
will consider likely resolutions.3
THE QUESTIONS RAISED By SALFI
Salfi involved a constitutional challenge to provisions of the legislation
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. B.A., Brandeis
University; J.D., Columbia University.
1. The legislation establishing the Supplemental Security Income Program (S.S.I.), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1381-91 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), authorizes assistance to those who are blind,
disabled, or aged who meet the statutory income and resources requirements. The S.S.I. pro-
gram was modeled after the Social Security program.
2. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
3. The procedural impact of Salfi was the subject of an excellent article by Dina Lassow.
See Lassow, Access to Federal Courts: The Impact of Weinberger v. Salfi, II CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 907 (Mar. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Lassowl. This Article revisits many of the questions
addressed by Lassow, some of which now have been definitively resolved.
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establishing the Social Security program which, with some exceptions, ex-
cluded a surviving spouse or stepchild from receiving Social Security benefits
upon the death of a spouse or stepparent unless the marital or parental rela-
tionship had existed for at least nine months prior to the death of the wage
earner.' The expressed purpose of this durational relationship requirement,
according to its legislative history, was to prevent the use of sham marriages
to obtain Social Security benefits.' A three-judge federal district court deter-
mined that the nine month requirement functioned as a conclusive presump-
tion violative of due process because the underlying presumption of a sham
marriage was not necessarily true and the claimant was not afforded an op-
portunity to disprove it.' The Supreme Court reversed. Although a majority
of the Court conceded that the requirement was both over and under-
inclusive,' it nevertheless held that since the legislative provision did not im-
pinge upon "important liberties cognizable under the Constitution,"' it was
not violative of due process as long as the provision was reasonably related
to the furtherance of a legitimate governmental end.' The Court, finding
that the required reasonable relationship was present, refused to find a due
process violation.10
4. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(c)(5), (e)(2) (1976).
5. 422 U.S. at 767.
6. Salfi v. Weinberger, 373 F. Supp. 961, 965 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
7. Salfi, 422 U.S. at 781. The Salfi Court noted that § 416(c)(5) probably excluded from
benefits some wives who had married "with no anticipation of shortly becoming widows" and
did not exclude those who might have anticipated this but whose spouses lived longer than
anticipated. Id.
The Supreme Court has recognized the legislative difficulty with making precise classifica-
tions and has tolerated categories which are underinclusive, overinclusive, or both. Underinclusive
classifications omit some of those who might logically be included, thus diluting the intended
legislative process. In contrast, overinclusive legislation affects individuals who would not be
considered to fall within the purview of the statute's purposes. Such legislation has been accepted
as a legitimate device to achieve a permissible statutory end. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 16-4 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE].
Professor Tribe notes that the Court has sometimes reviewed legislation which was both
underinclusive and overinclusive. Id. at § 16-4 n.20. In one such case, the Court struck down
the classification as being irrelevant to the legislative purpose of providing reimbursement of
court transcript costs. See Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966) (statute requiring repayment
of transcript costs by incarcerated appellant, but not those found guilty and not incarcerated,
burdened many appeals which were not frivolous while permitting other appeals which may
have been frivolous).
8. 422 U.S. at 785. It was on this basis that the Court distinguished its earlier decisions
in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (presumption which impacted on the right to raise
children), and Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFluer, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (presumption which
impacted on the right to have children). But see infra note 13 and accompanying text.
9. 422 U.S. at 777. Salf! involved a two-pronged standard. To withstand constitutional
scrutiny the means chosen by the legislature to further a legislative end must be reasonably
related to furthering that end and the end itself must be a legitimate governmental objective.
See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970) (state regulation which esta-
blished ceiling on aid to welfare recipients regardless of family's size or need held to be ra-
tionally related to state's legitimate goals of encouraging employment and maintaining a balance
between welfare families and the "working poor").
10. 422 U.S. at 781-85.
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The substantive holding of Salfi was, of course, significant. The Salfi ma-
jority applied the same standard that it had utilized in Dandridge V. Williams"
to resolve an equal protection claim to the conclusive presumption/due pro-
cess challenge presented by Salfi. Given the overlap between equal protec-
tion and conclusive presumption/due process claims,' 2 the Salf Court's ap-
proach was not surprising and clearly was intentional. Read together, Dand-
ridge and Salfi demonstrate the Supreme Court's unwillingness to seriously
review legislative judgments when ruling on equal protection and conclusive
presumption/due process challenges to social welfare legislation, which legisla-
tion does not impact on constitutional rights or involve "suspect" classifi-
cations.' 3 Both of these decisions illustrate that the analytical concepts of
over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness are of minimal significance in
evaluating the validity of constitutional challenges to social welfare legislation.
The importance of the Salfi decision is not limited to its substantive
holding. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Rehnquist, specifically
addressed or alluded to a number of procedural issues which are generally
relevant to federal litigation involving either: (1) constitutional challenges
to provisions of the Social Security, S.S.I., and Medicare legislation; or (2)
constitutional or federal statutory challenges to regulations promulgated to
implement this legislation. These issues include:
(a) the jurisdiction of a federal district court to entertain such challenges
and the related question of the exhaustion of administrative remedies;"
(b) the propriety of class actions; and
(c) the availability of injunctive and other equitable forms of relief.
In addressing these concerns, the Salfi Court both erected procedural obstacles
to federal litigation involving the Social Security, Medicare, and S.S.I. pro-
grams and left certain procedural questions unresolved.
In considering the jurisdiction of a federal district court to entertain a
11. 397 U.S. 471 (1970)
12. In most cases where it could be alleged that a statutory provision functions as a con-
clusive presumption, the facts will also justify alleging an equal protection violation. For exam-
ple, the plaintiff could contend that the provision discriminates unjustifiably between two classes.
Salf is illustrative of this point.
13. But see Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); United States Dept. of Agriculture
v. Moreno, 413 U.S 528 (1973); United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Murray, 413 U.S. 508
(1973); and Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) where the Supreme Court closely scrutinized
the legislature's judgment even in the absence of legislation which impacted on a constitutional
right or suspect classification. With the exception of Vlandis, these cases might be distinguished
from Dandridge on the basis of federalism concerns. The same, however, obviously could not
be said about Salfi.
For an attempt to objectify the Dandridge/Salfi standard of review, see Bice, Rationality
Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1980). See also Railroad Retirement Bd.
v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (recent United States Supreme Court decision discussing whether the
Dandridge standard is a "toothless" one), reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 960 (1980).
14. The question of a court's jurisdiction focuses on the authority or power of a court
to resolve a particular case. The issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies relates not to
a court's absolute power to resolve a particular case, but rather, to the appropriateness of
a court's exercise of that power at a particular time. 422 U.S. at 756-67.
19821
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
constitutional claim, like that presented in Salfi, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that one provision of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h),' 5
precluded federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.6 The Court
held, however, that another provision of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C
§ 405(g),' 7 specifically provided federal district courts with jurisdiction to
resolve constitutional challenges similar to those raised by Mrs. Salfi.' 8
The Court's conclusion regarding the availability of section 405(g) as a
jurisdictional vehicle for resolving Mrs. Salfi's claim gave rise to a number
of questions. First, section 405(g) authorizes federal district court review of
15. At the time Salfi was decided, § 405(h) read as follows:
(h) The findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing shall be binding
upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of fact or deci-
sion of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental
agency except as herein provided. No action against the United States, the Secretary,
or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under section 41 of Title 28
to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1970) (amended 1976). Justice Rehnquist noted that when 42 U.S.C. §
405(h) was first enacted in 1939 and prior to the recodification of Title 28 in 1948, § 41 of
Title 28 contained all of the significant grants of jurisdiction to federal district courts including
federal question jurisdiction under § 1331. 422 U.S. at 756 n.3.
Interestingly, the third and last sentence of section 405(h) presently reads as follows: "No
action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be
brought under sections 1331 or 1346 of Title 28 to recover on any claims arising under this
subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1976).
16. The Court rejected the following arguments of the plaintiff:
(a) Mrs. Salfi's action did not arise under the Social Security Act within the meaning of
§ 405(h) because it did not require the interpretation of or application of the statute to a par-
ticular set of facts, 422 U.S. at 764-65;
(b) The legislative history of § 405(h) indicated that Congress did not intend for the provi-
sion to preclude federal question jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to provisions of
the Social Security legislation; rather, the legislative history, according to Mrs. Salfi, indicated
that Congress enacted § 405(h) simply to preclude a claimant from filing a suit seeking benefits
and premising jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 without first filing an application with the
Secretary and exhausting the administrative remedies authorized by the legislation when a fac-
tual matter was in dispute, id. at 757-59;
(c) Mrs. Salfi's action, because it sought declaratory and injunctive relief and did not request
immediate payment of a claim as part of relief, was not an action "to recover on any claim"
within the meaning of § 405(h), id. at 760-61.
17. Section 405(g) reads in pertinent part:
Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to
which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a
review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the
mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Secretary
may allow. Such action shall be brought in the district court of the United States
for the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides or has his principal place of
business, or, if he does not reside or have his principal place of business within
any such judicial district, in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia .... The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript
of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a hearing.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970).
18. 422 U.S. at 764-67.
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any "final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing." After Salfi, an
obvious but important question was what constitutes a "final decision made
after a hearing" within the meaning of section 405(g).' 9 Second, the language
of section 405(g) seems to contemplate case-by-case adjudication."0 The ques-
tion then arises whether class actions are precluded in section 405(g) litiga-
tion. Third, section 405(g) contains both a sixty-day statute of limitations
and a venue requirement." Assuming class actions are permissible in section
405(g) litigation, it must then be determined whether these requirements limit
the scope of any proposed class. Fourth, section 405(g) seems to limit a
reviewing federal district court's jurisdiction to affirming, modifying, or re-
versing the decision of the Secretary. This apparent limitation raises doubt
regarding the power of a reviewing court to issue injunctive or other equitable
relief.
In addition to the above-mentioned concerns, three related procedural ques-
tions remain to be answered after Salfi. First, it is clear that the administrative
and judicial review provisions of the S.S.I. legislation" were modeled after
those contained in the Social Security legislation. 3 The corresponding review
provisions contained in the S.S.I. legislation, however, do not expressly in-
corporate section 405(h).2 ' If 405(h) is not applicable to S.S.I. litigation,
then federal question jurisdiction is not precluded for constitutional challenges
to provisions of the S.S.I. legislation or constitutional or federal statutory
challenges to the regulations promulgated to implement that legislation. Se-
cond, the specific holding of the Salf Court was that section 405(h) precludes
federal question jurisdiction over Social Security claims. It is uncertain,
however, whether the Court also was implicitly saying that a federal district
19. The procedures followed by the Social Security Administration provide for three levels
of administrative review after an initial determination on a claim for Social Security benefits
has been made. First, the claimant is entitled to a reconsideration of the initial decision, 20
C.F.R. § 404.907 (1982), followed by a hearing before a presiding officer designated by the
Bureau of Hearings and Appeals. Id. § 404.929. Finally, the claimant may appeal to a body
known as the Appeals Council. Id. § 404.967.
20. Note the language that "any individual, after any final decision . . . made after a
hearing to which he [the claimant] was a party . . . may obtain a review" and the "court
shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirm-
ing, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970 & Supp.
IV 1980) (emphasis added).
21. See supra note 17.
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(1),(2),(3) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
23. Compare id. with 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),(h) (1970). See S. REP. No. 550, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7 (1975) ("bill would make the provisions of law governing hearings and judicial review
under the supplemental security income (S.S.I.) program virtually identical to those of the social
security cash benefit and medicare programs") (statement of Senator Long, Finance Committee).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) reads as follows: "The final determination of the Secretary after
a hearing under paragraph (1) shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g)
of this title to the same extent as the Secretary's final determination under section 405 of this
title." 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (1976). As Lassow points out, this language should be compared
with language in the Medicare legislation. Lassow, supra note 3, at 912 n.66. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395(ii) (1976) (specifically incorporating § 405(h)).
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court is precluded from exercising jurisdiction over such claims under other
federal jurisdictional provisions such as the federal mandamus statute.2" In
other words, it is unclear whether the Salfi Court intended section 405(g)
to be the exclusive jurisdictional vehicle for resolving Social Security claims.
Third, the Court's conclusion that Mrs. Salfi's action arose under the Social
Security Act within the meaning of section 405(h), thus precluding federal
question jurisdiction, largely was premised on the fact that the claimant was
seeking benefits under the Act.16 If, however, the claim presented did not
concern a question affecting eligibility or the amount of benefits, but rather,
involved a constitutional challenge to the procedures by which eligibility for
and the amount of benefits were determined, it could be argued that such
a claim did not arise under the legislation within the meaning of section
405(h) or, further, that it was not an action to recover on any claim" within
the meaning of Section 405(h). Hence, federal question jurisdiction over such
claims would not be precluded. These three issues then also remained to
be resolved after Salfi. The practical importance of each, of course, depends
on the nature of the problems that are likely to arise in the course of premis-
ing jurisdiction for claims28 like Mrs. Salfi's on section 405(g).
ANSWERING THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY SALFI
The "Final Decision Made After a Hearing" Requirement
Federal district court review is permitted under section 405(g) only subse-
quent to the Secretary's "final decisions made after a hearing." The Salfi
Court concluded that this statutorily mandated condition precedent to the
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976). It generally is understood that federal mandamus jurisdiction
is limited to actions seeking to compel a federal officer to perform a legal duty which is clearly
required; that is, to compel a ministerial act. See Winningham v. United States Dept. of Hous.
& Urban Dev., 512 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1975).
26. The Salfi Court stated:
But it is just as fruitless to argue that the action does not arise under the Social
Security Act. For not only is it Social Security benefits which appellees seek to
recover, but it is the Social Security Act which provides both the standing and
the substantive basis for the presentation of their constitutional contentions.
• ..To contend that such an action does not arise under the Act whose benefits
are sought is to ignore both the language and the substance of the complaint and
judgment.
422 U.S. at 760-61.
27. LEVIN, FEDERAL LITIGATION; A LEGAL SERVICES PRACTICE MANuAL, 2-8 n.91 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as LEVINI.
28. It should be emphasized at this point that not all claims under the Medicare legislation
are cognizable under § 405(g). In particular, the jurisdiction of a federal district court to hear
claims brought by providers of services is a complex issue and is beyond the scope of this
Article. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(u) (1976). For an in-depth discussion of this issue, see Humana
of S.C., Inc. v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Dr. John T. McDonald Found.,
Inc. v. Califano, 571 F.2d 328 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 893 (1978), Trinity
Memorial Hosp. v. Associated Hosp. Servs., Inc., 570 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1977).
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exercise of section 405(g) jurisdiction could not be dispensed with based on
a judicial determination that requiring the exhaustion of administrative
remedies in a particular case would be futile. 9 Rather, the Court held that
it was within the sole discretion of the Secretary of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare,3" the agency responsible for administering the Social
Security program, to determine whether' a "final decision after a hearing"
had been made within the meaning of section 405(g). 3' Taken literally, the
Court's unconditional delegation to the Secretary of this determination could
result in a claimant being required to exhaust all available administrative
remedies prior to seeking federal district court review despite a clear indica-
tion that to do so would be futile. 2 Notwithstanding Salfi, it is doubtful
that Congress intended this result. 3
Taking its cue from Salfi, the Social Security Administration promulgated
regulations explicitly defining what constitutes a "final decision made after
a hearing" for both the Social Security and S.S.I. programs.3" Essentially,
the regulations require that for a decision to be deemed final within the
meaning of section 405(g), a reconsideration determination must have been
made by the Secretary and the parties must have agreed that the sole issue
in dispute was a legal one involving the constitutionality of a statutory
provision.33 If these conditions were satisfied, the claimant would not be
required to completely exhaust his available federal administrative remedies
prior to seeking federal district court review. 36
29. 422 U.S. at 766.
30. See Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1953, 3 C.F.R. 131 (1953), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. app.
at 286 (West 1967), and in 67 Stat. 631 (1953).
31. The Court stated: "Mhe statutory scheme is thus one in which the Secretary may specify
such requirements for exhaustion as he deems serves his own interests in effective and efficient
administration." 422 U.S. at 766.
32. Justice Brennan stated in his dissent that the Court could find no evidence that Con-
gress had this intent. 422 U.S. at 793-94 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33. Interestingly, the named plaintiff in Salfi only appealed through the reconsideration
stage. See supra note 19. The Court nevertheless found that a "final decision made after a
hearing" within the meaning of § 405(g) had transpired because the Secretary did not challenge
the sufficiency of the allegations of exhaustion in Mrs Salfi's complaint. Id. at 767. But see
422 U.S. at 801-02 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
34. The regulations governing the Social Security program, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.916(a)-(f) (1976),
and those governing the S.S.I. program, 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1424(a)-(f) (1976), became effective
November 18, 1975. Salfi was decided on June 26, 1975. The present regulations addressing
this issue can be found at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.923-.928 (1982) (Social Security) and 20 C.F.R.
§§ 416.1424-.1428 (S.S.I.) (1982).
35. The regulations were and remain applicable only when the sole issue in dispute is the
constitutionality of a statutory provision. They do not come into play when the sole issue is
whether regulations promulgated to implement the federal legislation are alleged to be unconstitu-
tional or inconsistent with the federal legislation. This distinction is clearly attributable to the
fact that the Secretary may repeal or amend any regulation, but he may not change congres-
sional mandates. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976) (right of Secretary to make and publish
rules and regulations) with 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (1976) (right to amend or repeal any provision
of the Act reserved to Congress).
36. Lassow, supra note 3, at 913, points out that this expedited appeal process seemingly
has been ignored.
19821
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Notwithstanding these regulations and the Court's seemingly unequivocal
language in Salfi, the Supreme Court quickly retreated from the position
that it was solely within the Secretary's discretion to determine what con-
stituted a "final decision made after a hearing" within the meaning of sec-
tion 405(g). As one commentator pointed out, 3 the first step in this retreat
was the Supreme Court's decision in Mathews v. Eldridge.38 Eldridge ad-
dressed whether due process required that a recipient of Social Security
disability benefits be afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior
to termination of those benefits. When Mr. Eldridge was notified that his
disability benefits would be terminated without an opportunity for such a
hearing, he filed suit in federal district court alleging that termination would
be violative of due process. Inasmuch as he did not seek a reconsideration
of the termination decision or raise his constitutional claim with the Secretary
prior to filing suit, the question was presented whether the plaintiff was
precluded from seeking federal district court review pursuant to section 405(g)
because there had been no "final decision made after a hearing." 39 In resolv-
ing the section 405(g) jurisdictional question, the Supreme Court bifurcated
the "final decision" requirement into two elements: a purely "jurisdictional"
requirement which could not be waived by the Secretary or judiciary; and
a second requirement which could be waived by the Secretary and, in some
circumstances, by the judiciary over the objections of the Secretary.40
The nonwaivable jurisdictional element required that a claim for benefits
be presented to the Secretary.'" As the Court wrote, "[a]bsent such a claim
there can be no 'decision' of any type. And some decision by the Secretary
is clearly required by the statute."' 2 The waivable element was that any
available administrative remedies' 3 had to be exhausted prior to seeking
federal district court review. As to this element, the Court retreated from
Salfi by concluding that, in some cases, a "claimant's interest in having a
particular issue resolved promptly is so great that deference to the agency's
judgment is inappropriate."" The Court found that Eldridge's claim came
within this category of cases for two reasons: first, the plaintiff's constitu-
tional challenge was collateral to any substantive claim for benefits, and
37. Id. at 908-09.
38. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Eldridge was decided on February 24, 1976, only eight months
after Salfi. It also is arguable that the Court's application of the final decision rule in Salfi
indicated that the Court did not intend to give the Secretary unlimited discretion. See supra
text accompanying note 32.
39. Although the Secretary moved to dismiss Eldridge's claim because he had failed to ex-
haust his available administrative remedies, 424 U.S. at 325, neither the district court opinion,
361 F. Supp. 520 (W.D. Va. 1973), nor the Fourth Circuit opinion, 493 F.2d 1230 (4th Cir.
1974), addressed any jurisdictional issue.
40. 424 U.S. at 328. See Lassow, supra note 3, at 909.
41. 424 U.S. at 328.
42. Id. The Court found that a decision unquestionably had been made by the Secretary
when he decided to terminate Eldridge's benefits. Id. at 332.
43. See supra note 19.
44. 424 U.S. at 330.
[Vol. 31:721
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second, given the nature of the claim, any decision made at a post-deprivation
hearing would not be responsive to his claim."'
The decision rendered in Eldridge represented a partial retreat from the
Court's conclusion in Salfi that the determination of what constitutes a "final
decision" pursuant to section 405(g) was to be made solely by the Secretary.
In Mathews v. Diaz," the Supreme Court retreated even further. In fact,
Diaz can be read for the proposition that the Court implicitly authorized
the judiciary not to require the exhaustion of available administrative remedies
despite the Secretary's objections, if exhaustion would be futile.
Diaz involved a constitutional challenge to provisions of the Medicare
legislation which limited eligibility to resident citizens over sixty-five and aliens
over sixty-five who had been admitted for permanent residence and had re-
sided in the United States for at least five years.' 7 Of the three named plain-
tiffs, two failed to meet both the five-year residency and the admission for
permanent residence requirements. They had attempted to enroll in the
Medicare program but had been denied for those reasons. The third named
plaintiff, who satisfied the permanent residency requirement, but could not
meet the five-year residency requirement, had not attempted to enroll at the
time the federal district court complaint was filed because he thought to
do so would be futile.'8 None of the plaintiffs, then, had exhausted their
available administrative remedies' 9 at the time the action was filed and the
Secretary moved to dismiss, in part,"0 for that reason. Subsequent to the
filing of the Secretary's motion to dismiss, the named plaintiff who had
not previously attempted to enroll, filed an application for benefits. The
Secretary never made a formal decision on this application.'
The Secretary's motion to dismiss, of course, raised the question of what
constitutes a "final decision" within the meaning of section 405(g). A three-
judge district court ruled that jurisdiction was present under section 405(g),
finding that the exhaustion of available administrative remedies was not re-
quired. The court based its decision on the fact that given the nature of
the claim, requiring the claimants to exhaust their administrative remedies
would have constituted an exercise in futility. 2 The lower court's ruling in
Diaz, however, was rendered prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Salfi.
45. Id. at 330-31. See Lassow, supra note 3, at 909. It would seem that these two con-
siderations identified in Eldridge overlap because only where claims are collateral to substan-
tive claims of entitlement is it likely that a decision at a later hearing would not be responsive
to the claim.
46. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
47. Id. at 70.
48. Id. at 71.
49. Id. at 72.
50. The Secretary's motion to dismiss was predicated on two additional grounds. First, the
plaintiffs had not alleged sufficient grounds to invoke the court's jurisdiction. In addition,
they had failed to show that they were entitled to injunctive relief. Motion to Dismiss, Mathews
v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
51. Id. at 75.
52. Diaz v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 1, 5 (S.D. Fla.), rev'd, 426 U.S. 67 (1973).
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The Supreme Court, then, in Diaz had to determine whether the lower court
was correct in not requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies over
the objections of the Secretary in light of Salfi.13
Notwithstanding the seemingly unequivocal language of Salf, the Supreme
Court held that the lower court had jurisdiction under section 405(g). It con-
cluded that the nonwaivable element of the final decision requirement had
been met because each of the named plaintiffs had attempted to enroll for
Medicare." ' As to the waivable element,"5 the Court held that a final deci-
sion had been made within the meaning of section 405(g) despite the
Secretary's protestations to the contrary since he had conceded the absence
of factual issues and that the applications had or would be denied because
of the challenged statutory provisions.5 6
The Court's decision in Diaz should eliminate any problems which might
arise concerning the final decision requirement when the only issue presented
is the constitutionality of a statutory provision. In this situation, it should
not be difficult to obtain a concession from the Secretary in the course of
pretrial discovery or in a motion for summary judgment stating that there
are no factual issues in dispute and that the sole issue is the constitution-
ality of a statutory provision. If such a concession is obtained, then although
the Secretary arguably has waived the waivable element of the final decision
requirement, in fact the Salfi standard of what constitutes a final decision
has been transformed into an inquiry as to whether exhaustion of available
administrative remedies would be futile.
. It is important to emphasize, however, that Diaz did not involve a con-
stitutional or statutory challenge to a regulation promulgated to implement
the Social Security, S.S.I., or Medicare legislation. Since the Secretary has
the power to repeal or amend implementing regulations when a legal challenge
to these regulations is raised, it can be argued that the final decision re-
quirement should be approached differently when legal issues arise out of
these regulations than when the action involves a constitutional challenge
to a statutory provision which the Secretary legally must follow. Arguably,
more deference should be accorded the Secretary when the legality of regula-
tions is at issue. This argument may seem appealing; however, there is no
53. Given the claim in Diaz, it was clear the Court could not rely on Eldridge to uphold
the lower court's exercise of jurisdiction.
54. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 72-73 (1976).
55. Id. at 76-77. The Court's treatment of the named plaintiff for whom no formal deci-
sion had been made on his enrollment application indicated that the waivable element of the
final decision requirement also included whether a formal decision had been made by the agen-
cy. This certainly was not evident from Eldridge.
56. In Diaz, the Secretary, in his motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, stipulated that no facts were in dispute, that the case was ripe for disposition by
summary judgment, and that the only issue before the district court was the constitutionality
of the statute. 426 U.S. at 76. The Court "treat[ed] the stipulation . . . as tantamount to
a decision denying the application and as a waiver of the exhaustion requirements." Id. at 77.
57. This would not be the case if the claimant's eligibility for benefits might be premised
on reasons unrelated to the challenged statutory provision.
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sound reason why in actions challenging the legality of regulations, a state-
ment could not be obtained from the Secretary in the course of pretrial
discovery or in a motion for summary judgment as to whether he plans to
repeal or amend the challenged regulation. If he does not plan to do either,
for purposes of the section 405(g) final decision requirement, constitutional
or statutory challenges to regulations should be accorded the same treat-
ment as constitutional challenges to statutory provisions.
This conclusion is supported by language in the Eldridge opinion. The
Court indicated, although admittedly in dicta, that it saw no reason to
distinguish between statutory challenges and regulatory challenges." Justice
Powell, writing for the Court in Eldridge stated:
The situation here is not identical to Salfi, for, while the Secretary had
no power to amend the statute alleged to be unconstitutional in that case,
he does have authority to determine the timing and content of the pro-
cedures challenged here. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a). We do not, however, regard
this difference as significant. It is unrealistic to expect that the Secretary
would consider substantial changes in the current administrative review
system at the behest of a single aid recipient raising a constitutional
challenge in an adjudicatory context. The Secretary would not be required
even to consider such a challenge."
This language and the fact that the administrative review process available
to a claimant is not designed to result in changes to the regulations further
support the notion that the final decision requirement should be applied
similarly to both controverted statutory provisions and regulations.
After Diaz, the following could be said about the "final decision" re-
quirement of section 405(g):
1. there is both a waivable and a nonwaivable element implicit
in the final decision requirement;6
2. the nonwaivable element requires that a claim for benefits be
presented to the Secretary before a decision can be deemed final; 6'
3. the waivable element includes whether there has been a formal
decision on the claim for benefits62 and whether the administrative
review process has been exhausted; 3
4. if a claim for benefits has been presented, a court should con-
clude that a "final decision" has been made notwithstanding the
58. The Court's comments were dicta in this context because they were made in the course
of the Court's discussion of whether the nonwaivable element of the final decision requirement
had been satisfied.
59. 424 U.S. at 329-30.
60. See id. at 319, 328 (1976).
61. This does not mean, as evinced in Eldridge, that there must be a formal application
for benefits. For a discussion of what action short of a formal application has been found
to satisfy this requirement, see Lassow, Supra note 3, at 913-15. See also Murillo v. Mathews,
588 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1978) (example of when the nonwaivable element of Eldridge has not
been satisfied).
62. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 75-77 (1976).
63. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328 (1976).
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Secretary's objections if the Secretary concedes that there are no
factual issues in dispute and the sole issue is the constitutionality
of a statutory provision."4 Similarly, when a regulation is challenged
on constitutional or statutory grounds, a final decision has been
made if the Secretary concedes that there are no factual issues in
dispute and he does not plan to amend or repeal the challenged
regulation;
5. if a claim for benefits has been presented, a claimant will not
be required to exhaust any available administrative remedies if his
claim is collateral to any substantive claim of entitlement and any
decision at a post-deprivation hearing would not be responsive to
his claim. 5
Subsequent to Diaz, the Supreme Court has addressed the section 405(g)
final decision requirement in only two cases, Califano v. Goldfarb," and
Califano v. Yamasaki. 67 Both decisions were consistent with the above
analysis. Goldfarb involved a constitutional challenge to a provision of the
Social Security legislation which barred a husband from receiving widower's
benefits unless he was receiving half of his support from his wife at her
death. A similar requirement was not imposed upon a wife seeking widow's
benefits. The petitioner sought federal district court review after his applica-
tion for benefits was denied. Admittedly, he did not exhaust his available
administrative remedies. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, noting the nature
of his claim, concluded that the final decision requirement had been
satisfied. 6' The Court wrote:
Although Mr. Goldfarb did not pursue an administrative appeal of the
denial of his application, appellant (the Secretary) concedes that because
the denial was based on his failure to meet a clear statutory requirement,
further administrative review would have been futile and the initial denial
was therefore "final" for purposes of the District Court's jurisdiction to
review it under § 405(g). 6
Goldfarb is consistent with the principle that if factual issues are not in
dispute and the sole question is the constitutionality of a statutory provision
over which the Secretary is powerless, then, notwithstanding Salfi, the
Secretary will be unable to insist that the claimant exhaust all his available
administrative remedies prior to seeking federal district court review.
Yamasaki involved a constitutional and statutory challenge to the pro-
cedures implemented by the Secretary to recover overpayments made in the
course of administering the Social Security program. Unlike Salfi, Diaz, and
Goldfarb, Yamasaki did not involve a constitutional challenge to a statutory
64. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 76-77.
65. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 330-32.
66. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
67. 442 U.S. 682 (1979).
68. 430 U.S. at 203 n.3.
69. Id.
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provision. Rather, like Eldridge, Yamasaki involved a challenge to regula-
tions adopted to implement the Social Security legislation. The crux of the
complaint in Yamasaki was that the claimants, who had allegedly received
overpayments, were entitled to an opportunity for an oral evidentiary hear-
ing prior to any recoupment of the overpayment from their present benefits.
Although the Supreme Court's discussion of the section 405(g) final deci-
sion requirement in Yamasaki was in the class action context," ° the Court's
analysis is equally relevant to the final decision requirement.
In Yamasaki, the lower courts7' had certified a class to include Social
Security recipients whose present benefits had or would be reduced or other-
wise adjusted without an opportunity for a prior oral evidentiary hearing.
The Secretary, in part, objected to any such class definition because it would
include those who had not objected to recovery of any overpayment," that
is, those for whom no final decision had been made within the meaning
of section 405(g). The Supreme Court, in part, agreed with the Secretary's
finding that the class was too broadly defined. The Court made clear,
however, that a class consisting of those who, in fact, had objected to any
recoupment was appropriate.73 Implicit in this conclusion is the notion that
if a claimant has objected to the proposed recoupment, thereby satisfying
the nonwaivable element of Eldridge by presenting a claim for benefits, then
the section 405(g) final decision requirement has been satisfied and no fur-
ther exhaustion of available administrative remedies is necessary. The Court
did not explain why further exhaustion of administrative remedies was not
required of class members. Arguably, the exhaustion of such remedies should
70. The Secretary conceded that the named plaintiffs had satisfied the requirements of
§ 405(g). 442 U.S. at 703.
71. In Yamasaki, the Supreme Court reviewed a decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, Elliott v. Weinberger, 564 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1977). Two district court actions, Elliott
v. Weinberger, 371 F. Supp 960 (D. Hawaii 1974), and Buffington v. Weinberger, No. 734-73
c2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 22, 1974), were consolidated when this case was first heard by the Ninth
Circuit, Elliott v. Weinberger, Nos. 74-1611 and 74-3118 (9th Cir. 1975). The initial Ninth Cir-
cuit decision, which found that the Secretary's recoupment procedures were unconstitutional,
was handed down prior to the Supreme Court decision in Eldridge. In Eldridge the Supreme
Court held that due process did not require an oral evidentiary hearing prior to the termination
of Social Security disability benefits. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-39 (1976). In
light of Eldridge, the Supreme Court vacated the initial Ninth Circuit judgement and remanded
the case for further consideration. Elliott v. Weinberger, 425 U.S. 987 (1976). On remand,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that due process required an opportunity for a prior evidentiary
hearing when a claimant requested a waiver of any received overpayment, but not when he
requested a reconsideration to determine whether any overpayment had been made. Elliott v.
Weinberger, 564 F.2d 1219, 1230-34 (9th Cir. 1977). See infra note 72 for a discussion of
the distinction between a reconsideration and a waiver request. In Yamasaki, the Supreme Court
reached the same conclusion but did so on statutory rather than constitutional grounds. 442
U.S. 682, 695-97 (1979).
72. Such an objection could take the form of a request for a reconsideration where the
claimant asserts that there has not been an overpayment, or a request for a waiver where the
claimant admits that there has been an overpayment but requests that any repayment be excus-
ed. See 42 U.S.C. § 404(b) (1976) (listing specific circumstances when repayment can be excused).
73. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 703-04 (1979).
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be required because the claimant might prevail on the substantive merits of
his claim that repayment should not be required. Moreover, because the legal
claim involved a challenge to the procedures promulgated by the Secretary
over which he has control, it is conceivable that the Secretary might modify
or repeal these procedures. Yet, given that the nature of the claim involved
whether claimants were entitled to a prior evidentiary hearing before a recoup-
ment of benefits, it is probable that the Yamasaki Court found its holding
in Eldridge dispositive." Although not articulated with reference to Eldridge,
the Court's conclusion concerning the final decision requirement is consis-
tent with the principles enunciated in Eldridge.
Federal appellate court decisions subsequent to Diaz also have been con-
sistent with the aforementioned analysis of the section 405(g) final decision
requirement. Illustrative of these decisions are the appellate court rulings
in Wilson v. Edelman," Ellison v. Califano,76 and Liberty Alliance of the
Blind v. Califano." Wilson involved a constitutional challenge to a provi-
sion of the S.S.I. legislation which excluded individuals residing in a public
institution from receiving benefits unless they were eligible for, and receiving,
Medicaid benefits. Although some of the named claimants had not exhausted
their available administrative remedies, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit concluded that all claimants had satisfied the final decision require-
ment. The Wilson court reached this conclusion, even though the Secretary
never expressly stipulated that the sole issue in dispute involved the con-
stitutionality of a statutory provision"8 and despite the fact that the Secretary
had argued that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction because of the
claimants' failure to exhaust available administrative remedies.79 The court
held that the final decision requirement was satisfied because the Secretary
submitted the matter for disposition on the merits by moving for summary
judgment80 and because at no time throughout the litigation had he made
any specific allegation that the reason for the denial of benefits was based
74. It also could be argued that the Court did not require further exhaustion since it was
clear that the Secretary was not going to change its recoupment procedures absent a judicial
order. See Salfi, supra note 33; Diaz, supra note 56 and accompanying text; Goldfarb, supra
note 69 and accompanying text. However, it could not be said that there were no factual issues
in dispute if required to pursue his administrative remedies because the claimant still might
have prevailed on his substantive claim.
75. 542 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1976).
76. 546 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1977).
77. 568 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1977).
78. 542 F.2d at 1272.
79. Id. at 1273. Although the Secretary initially filed a motion with the district court to
dismiss, he did not do so specifically because of the claimant's alleged failure to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies. Id. at 1272. This is not surprising because the complaint and the Secretary's
response were filed prior to the Supreme Court decision in Salfi. The Secretary subsequently
filed a cross motion for summary judgment in the alternative to the motion to dismiss and
while the parties were awaiting a decision, Salfi was decided. Id. at 1272 n.6. It was at this
point that the Secretary raised the issue of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at 1273.
80. It should be noted, however, that at the time the summary judgment motion was filed,
it was filed in the alternative to a motion to dismiss. Id. at 1273 n.27.
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on something other than the challenged statutory provision." The Wilson
opinion illustrates the willingness of a court to find that the final decision
requirement is satisfied irrespective of the objections of the Secretary if a
claim for benefits has been presented and the sole issue is the constitutionality
of a statutory provision.8"
A similar conclusion with regard to the section 405(g) final decision re-
quirement was reached in Ellison v. Califano."3 Ellison involved a constitu-
tional challenge to a provision of the S.S.I. legislation which implicitly pro-
vided that in computing benefits the income of a spouse was deemed available
to an eligible individual for six months after their separation if they had
not been divorced.' 4 When Mr. Ellison moved out, Mrs. Ellison sought an
increase in her benefits because she no longer had access to her husband's
income. The statutory provision at issue, however, precluded an increase in
her benefits. The Secretary moved to dismiss, based on the ground that the
court lacked jurisdiction under section 405(g) because the claimant had not
exhausted her available administrative remedies and, therefore, a final deci-
sion had not been made. 5 In fact, Mrs. Ellison had not even requested a
reconsideration prior to filing suit. The court, nevertheless, held that the
section 405(g) final decision requirement had been satisfied even though the
Secretary had not specifically conceded that a final decision had been made.
The court reached this conclusion because the record clearly indicated that
the Secretary knew the sole issue in the case was the constitutionality of
a statutory provision." Ellison is consistent with Wilson in illustrating the
willingness of courts to find that the final decision requirement has been
satisfied, prior to the exhaustion of all available administrative remedies,
when it is clear that the sole issue in dispute is the constitutionality of a
statutory provision.
Liberty Alliance of the Blind v. Califano7 differs from Wilson and Ellison
in that it did not involve a constitutional challenge to a statutory provision.
Rather, it involved a statutory challenge to the procedures utilized by the
Secretary to calculate the amount of S.S.I. benefits to which blind recipients
81. Id. at 1273.
82. The Seventh Circuit stated:
Mindful of Salfi's wisdom in imposing a safeguard against judicial review of un-
necessary constitutional issues, we recognize the importance of affording the Secretary
a full and adequate opportunity to satisfy himself that "the only issue ... is the
constitutionality of a statutory requirement, a matter which is beyond his jurisdic-
tion to determine, and that the claim is neither otherwise invalid nor cognizable
under a different section of the Act." Salfi did not, however, intend to permit
the Secretary to object to section 405(g)'s exhaustion requirement purely for the
purpose of defeating jurisdiction.
542 F.2d at 1273 (citations omitted).
83. 546 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1977).
84. Id. at 1163 n.l (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(b) (1976)).
85. Id. at 1163.
86. Id. at 1164-65.
87. 568 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1977).
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were entitled. It was alleged in Liberty Alliance that these procedures were
inconsistent with the S.S.I. enabling legislation. A class action was brought
by ten blind recipients and by an organization whose aim was to improve
the economic and social status of the blind. Only one named plaintiff,
however, had exhausted his available administrative remedies. As a result,
the Secretary's motion to dismiss the claims of the nine remaining named
plaintiffs was granted by the federal district court because a final decision
had not been made within the meaning of section 405(g). The court also
denied a motion for class certification concluding that the unnamed class
members could not satisfy the final decision requirement. The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. It reasoned, in part, that Diaz was
controlling because the sole issue in dispute was legal rather than factua.l8
Thus, the court held that a final decision had been made within the mean-
ing of section 405(g), as applied to the S.S.I. program, notwithstanding the
objections of the Secretary. In this context, the Liberty Alliance court did
not distinguish between the application of the final decision requirement in
cases involving statutory challenges and those involving constitutional
challenges. As the court wrote, "[the] test for exhaustion of a statutory issue
in an individual case . . . should be whether the Secretary has taken a final
position on that issue.''89 Emphasizing that the action was filed after eighteen
months of negotiations had not resolved the dispute, 90 the court con-
cluded that it was clear that the Secretary had taken a final position on
the question presented.9' The decision in Liberty Alliance, like the decisions
88. The court noted that the filing of a motion for summary judgment by the Secretary
suggested that the case was appropriate for judicial resolution. Id. at 346.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 344.
91. Significantly, the appellate court in Liberty Alliance also ruled that further exhaustion
of administrative remedies was not required because the case was governed by Eldridge, which
held that the "claimant's interest in having the particular issue resolved promptly is so great
that deference to the agency's judgment is inappropriate." 568 F.2d at 345 (quoting Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 330 (1976)). The Liberty Alliance court reached this conclusion because of the
nature of S.S.I. benefits which; unlike Social Security benefits, are contingent upon a demonstra-
tion of need. Because these S.S.I. benefits are based upon need, the court believed that the
claimant could not be made whole even if he prevailed at a post-deprivation hearing. The logic
of this argument finds some support in Eldridge. See 424 U.S. at 331-32. See also Caswell
v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1978) (exhaustion requirements met by plaintiff seeking
end to delays in scheduling administrative hearings because "statutory and constitutional claims
were collateral ... [and] effective relief [could not be] obtained by awaiting the final deter-
mination"); Mattern v. Mathews, 582 F.2d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 1978) (exhaustion requirement
met in challenge to recoupment procedure in accordance with Eldridge standards because claim
to hearing was collateral to substantive claim for benefits and plaintiff made colorable showing
of irreparable harm during interim reduction of benefits), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 912 (1974).
However, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court could accept this rationale because, taken
literally, exhaustion of administrative remedies might always be excused in S.S.1. cases. It is
true that in Eldridge, in explaining why exhaustion of administrative remedies would be excus-
ed, the Court emphasized that because of Eldridge's "physical condition and dependency upon
the disability benefits, an erroneous termination would damage him in a way not recompen-
sable through retroactive payments." 424 U.S. at 331. The primary rationale for the Eldridge
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in Wilson and Ellison, represents another illustration of a federal appellate
court's willingness to temper strict application of the section 405(g) final
decision requirement.
After a review of Ellison and Liberty Alliance, one commentator suggested
that the final decision requirement should not pose an insurmountable bar-
rier to claimants litigating Social Security, S.S.I., or Medicare claims.92 Given
the reported judicial decisions subsequent to Diaz, there is no reason to
disagree with this conclusion.93
decision was that given the nature of the constitutional claim presented, any decision at a post-
deprivation hearing would, by definition, not be responsive to that constitutional claim. See
supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
92. See Lassow, supra note 3, at 913-14.
93. Illustrative of the federal appellate Court decisions which have not strictly enforced
the final decision requirement where a substantive challenge to a legislative provision is involv-
ed is Wright v. Califano, 603 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980).
Wright involved the same constitutional issue presented in Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977), see supra text accompanying notes 66-69, although it was raised in the context of disability
insurance rather than widower's benefits. In the class action context, the Wright court noted
that the final decision requirement is satisfied when the sole issue is the constitutionality of
a statutory provision and the Secretary does not contend that further administrative proceedings
could have produced a different result. 603 F.2d at 669 n.9.
The final decision requirement has not been strictly enforced in cases involving procedural
challenges, as the following cases illustrate. In Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978),
the plaintiff instituted a statutory challenge to the processing delay at the hearing stage of
requests for Social Security disability benefits. The Caswell court found that Eldridge preclud-
ed any argument that all administrative remedies had to be exhausted. The Caswell opinion
noted the irony of arguing that the delay under challenge also would constitute a barrier to
jurisdiction under § 405(g). Id. at 14. Similarly, in Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345 (7th Cir.
1978), the court 'confronted a constitutional and statutory challenge to the delay in processing
at the hearing and appeals council stage of requests for Social Security old age and survivor's
benefits. The Wright court found that, based on Eldridge, dispensing with the requirement
that claimants had to exhaust all available administrative remedies in both constitutional and
statutory challenges was justified. Id. at 349.
In Mattern v. Mathews, 582 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 912 (1979),
the Third Circuit addressed the same issue presented in Yamasaki: whether claimants were en-
titled to an oral evidentiary hearing prior to recouping an overpayment of their benefits. The
Mattern court concluded that exhaustion was not required in light of Eldridge and Liberty
Alliance. Id. at 253. Consonant with Liberty Alliance, the court indicated, in part, that Eldridge
was controlling because the claimants could not be made whole by an award of retroactive
benefits because of their immediate need for Social Security benefits. See supra note 91. Mat-
tern, however, unlike Liberty Alliance, involved a claim which was collateral to a substantive
claim of entitlement. 582 F.2d at 253.
De Lao v. Califano, 560 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1977), Tatum v. Mathews, 541 F.2d 161 (6th
Cir. 1976), and Johnson v. Mathews, 539 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir. 1976) involved constitutional
challenges to the practice of terminating without prior evidentiary hearing the benefits of those
S.S.I. disability recipients who had been initially grandfathered into the S.S.I. program when
it was begun on January 1, 1974. In each, the appellate courts found the constitutional claim
to be collateral to a substantive claim for benefits and that Eldridge was controlling.
In Himmler v. Califano, 611 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1979), the Sixth Circuit confronted a con-
stitutional and statutory challenge to the Secretary's practice of failing to provide an oppor-
tunity for a prior hearing before a fiscal intermediary rejected compensation claims of Medicare
19821
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
Class Actions
In General
The right to challenge provisions of the Social Security, S.S.I., or Medicare
legislation or regulations enacted to implement such legislation in a class
action is important for a variety of reasons. First, class certification may
be a means of avoiding potential mootness problems."' Second, the class
action vehicle may be the most expeditious way to provide the broadest possi-
ble relief'5 to those affected by the challenged action. Third, because some
doubt exists as to whether the Social Security Administration will change
its policies in response to judicial decisions ruling on individual claims if
those decisions are not rendered by the Supreme Court,96 repetitive litiga-
tion may be required absent class actions. Fourth, because the impact of
a suit and the extent of relief are relevant considerations in assessing at-
torney's fees, if a suit is successfully maintained as a class action, the amount
of attorney's fees to which the claimant is entitled should be increased.' 7
There are, of course, certain disadvantages in class action litigation." First,
a court might be hesitant to grant the requested relief because of the wide
impact of any ruling." Second, any action brought as a class action will
invariably give rise to a number of procedural questions which are likely
to delay a ruling on the merits. Despite these drawbacks, the advantages
expenses incurred by eligible Medicare recipients. These expenses had been certified as necessary
by the beneficiary's physician and the hospital's utilization review committee. The court found
Eldridge to be controlling. Id. at 147.
94. See, e.g., United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980) (appeal of
a denial of class certification can be taken even after named plaintiff's substantive claim has
become moot); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980) (respondent's con-
tinued economic interest in class certification sufficient to allow appeal of adverse ruling on
class certification); Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (class action not moot where named
plaintiff no longer has personal stake in controversy, provided unnamed class members retain
sufficient personal stake in the controversy to ensure existence of adversary relationship and
named plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class).
95. Such relief may take the form of an award of retroactive benefits to class members,
or notice to class members that the challenged action was unlawful. Note, however, that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity may cause problems with regard to this type of relief. Lassow,
supra note 3, at 916-17.
96. Lassow, supra note 3, at 915, suggests that this is the policy of the Social Security
Administration. See also Yamasaki, 442 U.S. at 699 (Secretary indicated that he would appeal
adverse decisions or abide by them within the jurisdiction of the courts rendering them).
97. LEVIN, supra note 27, at 3-28. As of October 1, 1981, reasonable attorney's fees can
be awarded against the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976). Prior to the 1981
amendment, § 2412 provided for an award of costs excluding attorney's fees. This statutory
authorization of attorney's fees automatically terminates, however, on October 1, 1984. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d) (Supp. V 1981) (to be repealed effective Oct. 1, 1984 by Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2321, 2329).
98. The tactical considerations impacting on the decision of whether to bring an action
as a class action are discussed fully in LEVIN, supra note 27, at 3-27 to 3-29.
99. A court especially may be hesitant where an attempt is made to certify a nationwide
class. See supra text accompanying notes 108-21.
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accruing from class actions clearly make the class action a significant device
in federal litigation involving challenges to the provisions of the Social Se-
curity, S.S.I., and Medicare legislation, and to the regulations implementing
the legislation.
After Salfi, some commentators believed that the Court's decision cast
serious doubt on the availability of class actions in section 405(g) litigation.
The action in Salfi was brought and successfully maintained as a class action
in the trial court.' ° In addressing the jurisdictional requirements under sec-
tion 405(g), however, the Supreme Court said that the class allegations were
deficient because there were no allegations that each class member had met
the final decision requirement.'"' Although this conclusion did not necessarily
mean that in all section 405(g) litigation, class actions are not permissible,
the Court's categorical denial of jurisdiction over the claims of the class
members in SalfW led some to believe that class actions were, in fact, precluded
in all 405(g) litigation. In Diaz, however, the Supreme Court indicated that
this question remained to be resolved. The Diaz Court observed that the
trial court's certification of a class had been erroneous because the class
included individuals who had not met the final decision requirement.
However, because the Court found the challenged statutory provision to be
constitutional, it specifically noted that it was unnecessary to decide whether
a narrower class or subclass could have been properly certified and still been
consistent with the final decision requirement.' 2
After Salfi, the Secretary took the position that class actions were imper-
missible when federal district court jurisdiction was premised on section
405(g), even if class members were limited to those for whom a final deci-
sion had been made. In part, the Secretary relied on the language of section
405(g), asserting that Congress contemplated case-by-case adjudication.' 3 All
the federal courts of appeal which addressed this issue after Salf, however,
rejected this broad contention by the Secretary. ' In Califano v. Yamasaki,
the Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion, holding that there was no
absolute barrier to class actions in section 405(g) litigation.'0 5
The Yamasaki Court essentially viewed this question as involving a deter-
mination of whether Congress clearly and unequivocally had expressed an
intent to exempt actions premised on section 405(g) from the operation of
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' 6 The Court was unwilling
to attribute this intent to Congress simply from the language of section 405(g),
100. 422 U.S. 749, 755 (1975).
101. Id. at 764.
102. 426 U.S. 67, 71 n.3 (1976).
103. See supra note 20.
104. See Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978); Jones v. Califano, 576 F.2d 12
(2d Cir. 1978); Liberty Alliance of the Blind v. Califano, 568 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1977); Johnson
v. Mathews, 539 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir. 1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
105. 442 U.S. 682, 706 (1979). See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
106. 442 U.S. at 699-701. See also infra note 116.
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especially in light of the judicial resources conserved through class action
litigation. The Court also emphasized that many other federal jurisdictional
provisions were phrased in terms of individual plaintiffs, but class relief has
never been thought to be unavailable under them.' 7 The Yamasaki deci-
sion, therefore, definitely resolved one question raised by Salfi in a manner
favorable to program claimants.
Nationwide Class Litigation
Provisions of the Social Security, S.S.I., or Medicare legislation, and regula-
tions or procedures promulgated to implement this legislation affect in-
dividuals nationwide. As a result, the question arises whether it is proper
for a court to certify a nationwide class in actions challenging such provi-
sions, regulations, or procedures.'10 This precise question was addressed by
the Supreme Court in Yamasaki because in one of the two cases which were
consolidated on appeal in Yamasaki, a trial court had essentially certified
a nationwide class.'" 9 The court had defined the class to include "all in-
dividuals eligible for old age and survivors' benefits whose benefits have
been or will be reduced or otherwise adjusted without prior notice and
opportunity for a hearing.""10 It did, however, exclude from this class defini-
tion residents of Hawaii and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania because
suits raising similar issues had been filed in these jurisdictions."' With the
exception of these areas, the certified class included all class members residing
in the continental United States and Alaska.
The Secretary argued that it was inappropriate for the lower court to cer-
tify an essentially nationwide class for two reasons. First, he argued that
such class definitions preclude consideration by other federal district courts
of the issue posed. Second, he contended that such class definitions artificially
increase the pressure on the Supreme Court's docket by requiring the im-
mediate attention of the Court if a broad ruling unfavorable to the Secretary
is rendered."' Although the Supreme Court in Yamasaki did not minimize
the importance of these considerations, it did not believe that these con-
siderations necessitated precluding nationwide class certification in all cases.
Rather, these two contentions were to be considered by a trial court in exer-
cising its discretion with regard to the appropriate class definition." 3 With
regard to the concern of precluding other federal district courts from hear-
107. Id. at 700.
108. In addition to the legal propriety of nationwide class certification, the same tactical
considerations relevant in determining whether to bring a class action and how to define the
class are equally applicable in this context. See supra note 98. In particular, a claimant should
be reluctant to seek nationwide class certification by a judge whose record indicates that he
may make an unfavorable ruling on the substantive claim.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 70-74.
110. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 689 (1979).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 701-02.
113. Id.
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ing the substantive issue posed, the Court noted that the trial court had
been sensitive to this consideration by excluding potential class members from
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and Hawaii."" At a miminum, a class
definition which includes class members residing in judicial districts where
similar litigation is pending is inappropriate. In addition, in addressing the
nationwide class issue, the Yamasaki Court emphasized that the trial court
had determined that counsel was adequate to represent the interests of the
class." Certainly, an evaluation of the adequacy of counsel should be a
crucial consideration in resolving the issue of whether to certify a nation-
wide class. With the exception of identifying these considerations, however,
Yamasaki did not specifically delineate how a court should decide whether
to certify a nationwide class. Nevertheless, there is no reason why nation-
wide classes should not be certified subject to the considerations outlined
above and other factors traditionally considered in making a class deter-
mination." 6
There have not been any Supreme Court or federal court of appeals deci-
sions subsequent to Yamasaki that have directly considered certification of
a nationwide class."' The district court decisions rendered subsequent to
Yamasaki' s which have addressed this issue have paid particular attention,
as suggested by Yamasaki, to whether certification of a nationwide class
will interfere with pending litigation in which the same issue is raised, and
whether the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have been satisfied. Morrell v. Harris"9 is illustrative of these decisions. Mor-
rell involved a constitutional challenge to the Secretary's policy of denying
automatic cost of living increases to disputed S.S.I. benefits when a hearing
was pending as to the amount the claimant should receive. Although the
Secretary recognized that benefits had to be paid to a recipient who had
114. Id. at 702-03.
115. Id.
116. Factors traditionally considered in making class determinations include whether the claim
of the representative party is typical of the claims of the class members and whether the represen-
tative party will adequately represent the interests of the class. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a).
117. One week after Yamasaki, the Supreme Court alluded to the propriety of certifying
a nationwide class in Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979). In Boles, the trial court had
held that a provision of the Social Security legislation which precluded a mother, who had
never married the wage earner contributing to social security, from receiving mother's insurance
benefits if her child was eligible for and receiving children's insurance benefits violated due
process. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Secretary argued, in part, that the lower court
certification of a nationwide class was inconsistent with the final decision requirement. The
Supreme Court concluded that the challenged provision was constitutional and, therefore, saw
no need to address the class action issue. Id. at 296.
118. See, e.g., McClure v. Harris, 503 F. Supp. 409 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (certified class of
beneficiaries excluded persons who were named plaintiffs or members of plaintiff class in any
other actions against Secretary of H.E.W. on similar issues); Holman v. Califano, 83 F.R.D.
488 (M.D. Pa. 1979) (court certified class after determining it had jurisdiction over the claims
of the class members and that the requirements of Rule 23 were satisfied).
119. 505 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D. Pa. 1981), judgment stayed, 452 U.S. 1301 (Rehnquist, Circuit
Justice 1981).
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received a notice of termination or reduction and who had made a timely
request for a hearing, he refused to apply automatic cost of living increases
to the amount paid pending the hearing. The court deferred certification
of a nationwide class because the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure'20 had not been satisfied.' 2 ' The
court indicated, however, that it saw no reason why a nationwide class could
not otherwise be certified because no similar litigation was pending in other
judicial districts, the Secretary's policy had nationwide application, and the
other requirements of Rule 23 were satisfied.'22
Class Actions and the Final Decision Requirement
The interrelationship between the section 405(g) final decision requirement
and class action litigation was first broached by the Supreme Court in
Weinberger v. Salfi. The Salfi Court concluded that the class definition was
deficient because it failed to allege that the class members had filed an
application for benefits and that a final decision had been made.' 23 Implicit
in this finding was the conclusion that if class actions were permitted in
section 405(g) litigation, any class could include only those individuals for
whom a final decision had been made. The Supreme Court's discussion of
the class action question in Mathews v. Diaz led to this same conclusion.'2 4
The pivotal question after Salfi and Diaz concerned the appropriate stan-
dard to be used in evaluating whether class members had satisfied the final
decision requirement of section 405(g). Conceptually, there appears to be
no reason why the standard used for unnamed class members should differ
from the standard used for named plaintiffs. As one commentator noted,'"
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reached this very conclusion in Liberty
Alliance,'2' and the Supreme Court implicitly sanctioned this approach in
Yamasaki.
The Secretary in Yamasaki argued that the class definition approved by
the lower courts included individuals who had not satisfied the final deci-
sion requirement because certain members of the defined class had not re-
quested either a reconsideration alleging that there had not been an over-
payment or a waiver alleging that an overpayment which had been made
should be excused. The Yamasaki Court agreed with the Secretary and held
that the class was too broad given these otnissions.'" The Court noted,
120. Rule 23(a)(1) provides: "One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as represen-
tative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable. ... FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
121. Id. at 1069 (class must be so numerous that.joinder of all parties is impracticable).
122. Id. at 1068-69.
123. 422 U.S. 749, 764-65.
124. See 426 U.S. 67, 71 n.3 (1976).
125. See Lassow, supra note 3, at 915.
126. Liberty Alliance of the Blind v. Califano, 568 F.2d 333, 345-46 (3d Cir. 1977).
127. 442 U.S. 682, 704 (1979). See also supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. This con-
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however, that the relief ordered"" by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
would benefit only those who had requested a waiver. Since requesting a
waiver, by definition, involves presenting a claim for benefits, the Court
concluded that the relief mandated by the Ninth Circuit was only available
to those who met the final decision requirement. 12 9 Implicit in this finding
that unnamed class members who had only requested a waiver had satisfied
the final decision requirement is the conclusion that the same standard should
be applied to both unnamed class members and named plaintiffs in deter-
mining whether the final decision requirement had been satisfied. Essential-
ly, the Court was stating that if Eldridge or Diaz obviated the requirement
that the named plaintiffs exhaust any available administrative remedies,
assuming a claim for benefits had been presented, then the same should be
true with regard to any unnamed class members such as those awarded relief
in Yamasaki. It also should be emphasized with regard to the interrelation-
ship between the final decision requirement and class action litigation that
Yamasaki involved a constitutional and statutory challenge to the regula-
tions and procedures followed by the Secretary in effectuating recoupment
of overpayments, procedures over which the Secretary has control. The fact
that the Court did not require the exhaustion of all available administrative
remedies indicates that the Court will apply the same standard regarding
the final decision requirement to unnamed class members and the named
plaintiff regardless of whether a regulation is challenged on constitutional
or statutory grounds or whether a statutory provision is challenged on con-
stitutional grounds. 130
After Yamasaki, any class should be defined in terms of those individuals
who have been adversely affected by a challenged statutory provision or
regulation and for whom a final decision has been made. Depending upon
the nature of the claim, the fact that an individual has been adversely af-
fected may not be sufficient to satisfy the nonwaivable element of the final
decision requirement. A request that the Secretary review that adverse action
may be required. 3 '
clusion is also significant with regard to the nonwaivable element of the final decision require-
ment set out in Eldridge. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. Compare Yamasaki,
442 U.S. at 704 (mere fact that a claimant's benefits have or will be terminated or reduced
in and of itself may not be sufficiert to satisfy the nonwaivable element that a claim for benefits
be made) with Ellison v. Califano, 546 F.2d 1162, 1164 (5th Cir. 1977) (claim for benefits
was automatically presented to Secretary when recipient sought increased benefits when wife
reported separation from her spouse).
128. The Ninth Circuit ordered that claimants who had requested a waiver of any overpay-
ment be provided an opportunity for a prerecoupment oral evidentiary hearing. See Elliott
v. Weinberger, 564 F.2d 1219, 1235 (9th Cir. 1977). The Court believed that those recipients
who merely requested a reconsideration were not entitled to a prerecoupment oral hearing.
129. 442 U.S. at 703-04.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
131. Note that this requirement must be fulfilled regardless of whether the suit involves a
class action.
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Class Action and the Statute of Limitations and Venue
Section 405(g) contains a sixty-day statute of limitations and a venue re-
quirement. In Saifi, the Supreme Court clearly stated that both requirements
will be deemed to be waived if not raised by the Secretary.' 32 If raised,
however, they each pose serious problems to the maintenance of class ac-
tions. To the extent that either requirement might limit the makeup of a
proposed class, the advantages of instituting a class action are minimized.
In an opinion authored by Justice Stevens when he sat on the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, the court in Jimenez v. Weinberger' concluded
that the pendency of a complaint seeking class relief tolled the statute of
limitations for any unnamed class members. 34 As a result, individuals with
claims similar to those advanced in pending class action litigation need not
be concerned that the sixty-day statute of limitations would bar their claims
if they do not seek to intervene or file a separate action. Where a final
decision has been made on an individual's claim more than sixty days prior
to the filing of the class action, however, it is clear that the individual can-
not properly be considered part of the class if the Secretary objects to his
inclusion."' Although it has been suggested that it might be advisable when
defining a class to avoid any reference to the sixty-day statute of limitations
in the hope that the Secretary would not raise it,' 36 it is unlikely that any
competent counsel for the Secretary would overlook the requirement. As one
commentator correctly concluded,' 37 if the statute of limitations question is
raised, any class should be defined in terms of those who have been adversely
affected by the challenged statutory provision, regulation, or procedure and
for whom a section 405(g) final decision has been made no earlier than sixty
days prior to the filing of the class action complaint.' 3' If defined in this
manner, the section 405(g) statute of limitations will not pose an insurmoun-
table barrier to section 405(g) class action litigation. 3
Taken literally, section 405(g)'s venue requirement would limit class
members to those individuals adversely affected by the challenged statutory
provision, regulation, or procedure who reside or have their principal place
of business in the district where the action is filed. Although any venue ob-
132. 422 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1975).
133. 523 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
134. Id. at 696-97. The court also emphasized that if the motion seeking class certification
was denied, the statute of limitations would continue to be tolled if that decision was appealed.
135. See, e.g., Mertz v. Harris, 497 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (court only had jurisdic-
tion over class members who had received notice of denial of benefits less than sixty days
prior to date action was filed); Cooper v. Califano, 81 F.R.D. 57 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (class was
defined to reflect the § 405(g) statute of limitations).
136. Lassow, supra note 3, at 916 n.12.
137. Id. at 915-16.
138. See, e.g., Wright v. Califano, 603 F.2d 666, 668 n.5 (7th Cir. 1979).
139. Interestingly, although Yamasaki addressed a number of issues relating to the propriety
of class actions in § 405(g) litigation, it did not address the question raised by the sixty-day
statute of limitations.
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jection could be waived, a strict application of the venue requirement is seem-
ingly inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Yamasaki approving
of nationwide classes. Although the section 405(g) venue requirement was
not discussed in Yamasaki, it is inconceivable that the Supreme Court would
have approved the certification of a nationwide class had it discerned that
such an action would be improper if a venue objection was raised by the
Secretary. Assuming that a class is properly defined in light of the factors
delineated in Yamasaki" and Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, and that the final decision requirement has been satisfied for each
class member, the Secretary is not prejudiced if the class is defined to in-
clude those who do not literally meet the section 405(g) venue requirement. 4 1
Thus, this venue requirement should not be a barrier to class definitions
which include individuals who reside or have their principal place of business
in a federal judicial district other than the one in which the action is filed.
Notice to Class Members
Most class actions challenging provisions of the Social Security, S.S.I.,
or Medicare legislation or the regulations or procedures promulgated
thereunder will be premised on Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.' 2 The mandatory notice requirements of Federal Rule 23(c)(2)
are not applicable to (b)(2) class actions. 4 3 Yet, the question has arisen
whether due process requires that notice be given to section (b)(2) class
members because of the potential res judicata effect of any ruling on the
merits after class certification, " especially if the claim for relief includes
a claim for benefits wrongfully withheld. In Elliott v. Weinberger,145 a class
140. See supra text accompanying notes 114-16.
141. In Holman v. Califano, 83 F.R.D. 488, 494 (M.D. Pa. 1979), the court rejected the
Secretary's argument that the § 405(g) venue requirement could preclude the certification of
a statewide class.
142. Rule 23(b)(2) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVM PROCEDURE provides:
(b) An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivi-
sion (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or cor-
responding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole....
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
143. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 n.14 (1974).
144. See Air Line Steward Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636 (7th
Cir. 1973) (class members with interests antagonistic to the rest of the class could exclude
themselves from the class and not be bound by prior judgment affecting the class as a whole),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974); Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973)
(grant of individual relief to some members of class was res judicata and precluded such relief
to those members who were entitled to it but failed to respond to notice); Schrader v. Selective
Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 76, 470 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1972) ("absolute failure to give any indicia
of notice to absent class members" precludes application of res judicata to such members),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1085 (1972).
145. 564 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1977), aff'd sub nom. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979).
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action premised on Rule 23(b)(2), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals con-
cluded that, although the claimants sought the recovery of monies wrongfully
withheld by the Secretary, the mandatory notice provisions of Rule 23(c)(2)
were not applicable because plaintiffs' primary purpose was to enjoin the
challenged practice. ' Essentially, the court concluded that a claim for
benefits wrongfully withheld did not convert a section (b)(2) class action
into a section (b)(3) action within the meaning of Rule 23 when the primary
purpose of the action was to seek injunctive relief. The court further held
that due process did not require notice in every section (b)(2) class action." 7
The court believed that notice might be constitutionally mandated only if
a question arises concerning whether the claims of the representative parties
are typical of the claims of the class or whether the representative party
will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.", The net effect
of the Elliott holding, which was approved implicitly by the Supreme Court
in Yamasaki, is that notice to potential class members, as a general rule,
should not be required in section (b)(2) class actions even when claims for
the recovery of benefits wrongfully withheld are involved.
Injunctive Relief
The question of the availability of injunctive and other equitable relief
in section 405(g) litigation is significant for a variety of reasons. First, a
court may be powerless to prevent irreparable injury without the authority
to enter an injunctive order pending a final decision on the merits. Second,
if injunctive relief is granted, the remedy of contempt is available to a claim-
ant who believes the Secretary has not complied with a judicial order.
Arguably, absent an injunctive order, if the Secretary refuses to comply with
a judicial decision requiring the payment of benefits or reversing a ruling
of the Secretary, a claimant must obtain an order requiring compliance before
the contempt remedy is available." 9 Third, given the language of Rule 23(b)(2)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' 0 the propriety of premising a class
action on section (b)(2) may be dependent upon the availability of injunc-
tive relief. Fourth, as one author has suggested,'"' if injunctive relief is
unavailable and class membership is, or can only be, defined because of
the final decision requirement in terms of those who have been adversely
affected by the challenged practice, then a decision invalidating the challenged
practice will not inure to the benefit of those adversely affected in the future
146. Id. at 1228.
147. Id. For a list of cases addressing this question, see id. n.13. See also Holman v. Califano,
83 F.R.D. 488 (M.D. Pa. 1979) (nature of class makes it difficult to notify class members
and is not required in all 23(b)(2) class actions); Aznavorian v. Califano, 440 F. Supp. 788
(S.D. Cal. 1977) (prejudgment notice to absent class members not required), rev'd, 439 U.S.
170 (1978).
148. 564 F.2d at 1228-30.
149. Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524 (1976).
150. See supra note 142.
151. See Lassow, supra note 3, at 916-17.
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unless a method is available to ensure that the Secretary adheres to the
decision.'"
The question of the availability of injunctive relief in section 405(g) litiga-
tion initially was raised in a footnote in Salf.'" In this footnote, the Court
noted that section 405(g) only empowers a reviewing court "to affirm,
modify, or reverse a decision of the Secretary."""4 It contained no sugges-
tion that a reviewing court had the authority to order injunctive relief.
Because the Salfi Court ruled against the claimant on the merits, " , however,
and because the Supreme Court had direct appellate jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1252, 16 the Court had no reason to address specifically the ques-
tion of the availability of injunctive relief in section 405(g) litigation."
152. The decisions in both Cooper v. Harris, 87 F.R.D. 107 (E.D. Pa. 1980), and Cooper
v. Califano, 81 F.R.D. 57 (E.D. Pa. 1978), provide examples of the problems that might arise
in this context. Although the Harris court noted that it had the power to order injunctive
relief, it chose not to enjoin the future application of the challenged statutory provision. The
net result was that the court's decision invalidating the challenged statutory provision did not
inure to the benefit of all those adversely affected by the provision because the Secretary re-
fused to follow the court's decision.
153. 422 U.S. 749, 763 n.8 (1975).
154. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970)).
155. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
156. 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976) authorizes a direct appeal from a federal district court to the
Supreme Court if the district court holds an Act of Congress to be unconstitutional. The district
court in Salf had found an Act of Congress to be unconstitutional. Thus, the Supreme Court
did not have to premise its jurisdiction to hear the appeal on 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976), which
authorizes an appeal as a matter of right from orders in injunction actions that require a three-
judge district court. If Supreme Court jurisdiction was only available in Salfi under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1253, then the Court necessarily would have had to resolve the question of whether injunc-
tive relief is available in § 405(g) litigation because a three-judge federal district court only
was required in an action seeking injunctive relief.
157. The issue was next presented to the Supreme Court in Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S.
524 (1976), in an indirect fashion. Lassow, supra note 3, at 909. Norton involved a direct
appeal to the Supreme Court of a three-judge court decision upholding in the face of a con-
stitutional challenge a provision of the Social Security legislation. The jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to entertain the direct appeal was premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1253. This statutory provi-
sion gave the Supreme Court the authority to review decisions of properly convened three-
judge district courts. However, the three-judge court in Norton had jurisdiction only if the
court had the authority to enjoin the enforcement of a federal statute because it was unconstitu-
tional. See 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1972) (repealed 1976). If, under § 405(g), the court lacked the
authority to issue injunctive relief, then a three-judge court should not have been convened
to hear Norton's claim. And, if a three-judge court should not have been convened, the Supreme
Court lacked jurisdiction to hear Norton's appeal. Unlike Salfi, the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court could not have been premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1252 because the lower court had not
invalidated the challenged federal statutory provision. Implicit in any Supreme Court decision
addressing the merits in Norton would be a finding that the three-judge court was properly
convened and injunctive relief was available in § 405(g) litigation. On the other hand, a deci-
sion dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction would mean that injunctive relief was not
available in § 405(g) litigation.
Nothwithstanding the above, the Court in Norton managed to avoid resolving the question
of the availability of injunctive relief in § 405(g) litigation. It did so by relying on its decision
in a companion case, Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). The substantive issue presented
19821
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
The Supreme Court resolved this issue in Yamasaki.1 "1 As he did with
regard to the propriety of class, actions, the Secretary argued that the language
of section 405(g) did not contemplate injunctive relief. He also contended
that injunctive relief was not necessary because claimants would have an
adequate remedy at law if a court reversed his determination.'" The Court
disagreed. Although it implicitly noted that the question was one of statutory
construction, the Court concluded that, in the absence of a clear command
from Congress to the contrary, the federal district courts possessed the power
to issue injunctions in actions over which they had jurisdiction.' ° The
Yamasaki decision also discussed the significance of the availability of in-
junctive relief in preventing irreparable injury and the availability of the
remedy of contempt against a recalcitrant Secretary. By definitively answer-
ing the question of whether injunctive relief was available in section 405(g)
actions, the Yamasaki Court resolved an important question left unanswered
in Salfi.
Salfi and Challenges to the S.S.. Legislation and Regulations and
Procedures Promulgated to Implement It
The statutory judicial review provisions governing the S.S.I. program do
not specifically incorporate section 405(h).' 6' For this reason it has been sug-
gested that the Salfi decision, precluding federal question jurisdiction over
in Lucas was identical to the one posed in Norton. Because injunctive relief was not sought
in Lucas, however, a three-judge court was not required to resolve the case. Id. at 502 n.6.
A single district court judge in Lucas found the challenged statutory provision to be unconstitu-
tional. Given this holding, the Supreme Court in Lucas had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1252 to hear the Secretary's direct appeal to that court. Thus, the jurisdictional question, which
was present in Norton and which impacted on the availability of injunctive relief in § 405(g)
litigation, was not present in Lucas.
The Supreme Court in Lucas reversed the district court holding that the challenged statutory
provision was unconstitutional. Given this holding, the Court in Norton concluded that there
was no need to resolve the jurisdictional question presented by Nortons's appeal. It reasoned
that given its decision in Lucas, irrespective of how it ruled on the jurisdictional question,
the ultimate result would be the same, that is, the claimant's constitutional challenge would
be denied. The Court emphasized that if it accepted jurisdiction and entered a ruling on the
merits, then in light of Lucas, it would deny Norton's claim. On the other hand, if it re-
manded the matter to a single district judge because it lacked jurisdiction, the district court
would be bound in light of Lucas to rule against the claimant. Hence, the Court in Norton
concluded that any jurisdictional ruling would have no bearing on the ultimate outcome of
the case. In light of this, it chose to defer ruling on the jurisdictional question and implicitly
on the question of the availability of injunctive relief in § 405(g) litigation. Norton, 427 U.S.
at 531-32.
158. 442 U.S. 682 (1979). The courts of appeal which had addressed this question had con-
cluded that injunctive relief was available in § 405(g) litigation. See Caswell v. Califano, 583
F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978); In re Letourneau, 559 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1977); Johnson v. Mathews,
539 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir. 1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
159. 442 U.S. at 704-05.
160. Id. at 705.
161. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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Social Security claims, is inapplicable to challenges involving provisions of
the S.S.I. legislation and its implementing regulations and procedures.' 2
Because S.S.I. is a need rather than an insurance program, it has been argued
that Congress would not have intended to require the exhaustion of available
administrative remedies in S.S.I. litigation where only legal issues are in
question.' 3 This question is important to the extent that lower courts after
Salfi might literally interpret certain language contained therein to mean that
it is within the sole discretion of the Secretary to determine what constitutes
a final decision within the meaning of section 405(g) in S.S.I. litigation. If
only the Secretary can determine whether a final decision has been made,
and section 405(g) is the exclusive jurisdictional vehicle for reviewing that
final decision, then significant delays in litigating legal challenges to provi-
sions of the S.S.I. legislation or implementing regulations may arise. In ad-
dition, as previously noted, after Salfi the question of whether injunctive
relief and class actions are available in section 405(g) litigation remained
to be answered. If class actions and injunctive relief were not available, the
question of the application of section 405(h) to S.S.I. litigation would ac-
quire added significance. Given, however, the Supreme Court's treatment
of the section 405(g) final decision requirement after Safi and its holding
in Yamasaki with regard to the availability of class actions and injunctive
relief in section 405(g) litigation, the practical significance of whether sec-
tion 405(h) is applicable to S.S.I. litigation is minimal. Exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies, when solely legal issues are in dispute, should no longer
be a significant issue in section 405(g) litigation; nor should class actions
or injunctive relief be precluded. Consequently, the question of whether sec-
tion 405(h) and Salfi are applicable to S.S.I. litigation will only be of prac-
tical significance because of potential statute of limitations difficulties in
premising jurisdiction in S.S.I. cases on section 405(g), especially in the class
action context, and because of the potential problems in meeting the non-
waivable element of the "final decision" requirement.
There appears to be only one decision directly holding that section 405(h)
is not equally applicable to actions involving the S.S.I. and Social Security
programs.' 6 In other actions challenging provisions of the S.S.I legisla-
tion or implementation regulations, courts have applied Salfi and its pro-
geny, noting that the statutory judicial review provisions of the S.S.I. legisla-
tion specifically incorporate section 405(g).' 6 Arguably, these decisions are
162. See Lassow, supra note 3, at 912-13.
163. Id. at 912.
164. See Maher v. Mathews, 402 F. Supp. 1165, 1173 n.30 (D. Del. 1975). This decision
did not address the question of whether § 405(h) precluded federal question jurisdiction over
S.S.I. claims. Rather, the court held that mandamus jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976),
was available in S.S.I. cases notwithstanding § 405(h), and that § 405(h) precluded mandamus
jurisdiction in Social Security cases.
165. See supra note 24; Liberty Alliance of the Blind v. Califano, 568 F.2d 333, 344 (3d
Cir. 1977); Wilson v. Edelman, 542 F.2d 1260, 1270-71 (7th Cir. 1976); Tatum v. Mathews,
541 F.2d 161, 164 n.2 (6th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Mathews, 539 F.2d 1111, 1117 (8th Cir. 1976).
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not technically responsive to the contention that because S.S.I. is a need,
rather than an insurance program, Congress would not have intended to
require the exhaustion of available administrative remedies in S.S.I. litiga-
tion where only legal issues are in question. Nevertheless, because the S.S.I.
judicial review provisions specifically incorporate section 405 and because
Congress modeled these provisions after those contained in the Social Security
legislation, it is unlikely that Congress would have intended for different
judicial review procedures to govern claims arising under the Social Security
and S.S.I. programs, notwithstanding that S.S.I. eligibility is premised upon
need. Given, however, the Supreme Court's treatment of the final decision
requirement subsequent to Salfi, and its holding in Yamasaki concerning class
actions and injunctive relief, the resolution of this question is not of great
practical significance.
Salfi and Procedural Challenges to the Manner in Which
Benefits Are Determined
Section 405(h) of the Social Security legislation specifically precludes federal
question jurisdiction for any action "to recover on any claim arising under
this subchapter.""I The Supreme Court in Salfi emphasized this language
in reversing the lower court's finding of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. '67
Salfi, of course, involved a challenge to a substantive statutory provision
defining eligibility for Social Security benefits. If, however, a claim was
presented involving a challenge to the procedures utilized in determining
eligibility or the amount of benefits, it could be argued that actions of this
nature are not "actions to recover on any claim" within the meaning of
section 405(h) because they do not seek an order granting benefits but only
an order that legally appropriate procedures be utilized. If such actions do
not seek to recover benefits within the meaning of section 405(h), federal
question jurisdiction over such claims should not be precluded. In addition,
with regard to solely constitutional challenges to Social Security, S.S.I., or
Medicare procedures, to the extent, such challenges do not directly seek
benefits and do not require an interpretation of those procedures, the ques-
tion arises whether section 405(h) governs such actions since arguably they
do not "arise under" those programs within the meaning of Section 405(h)."'
Before addressing these issues, it should be emphasized that they are of
practical significance only to the extent that Salfi poses significant obstacles
to litigating such procedural claims under section 405(g). As emphasized
previously, the decisions of the Supreme Court rendered subsequent to Salfi
have dispensed with most of these obstacles. Problems arising from the sec-
tion 405(g) statute of limitations, particularly in the class action context,
166. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1976) (emphasis added).
167. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 756-62 (1976).
168. See LEVIN, supra note 27, 2-8 n.91; infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
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and problems that may emanate from the nonwaivable element of the final
decision requirement, are possible exceptions.
The argument that legal challenges to the procedures used to determine
eligibility and the amount of benefits are not actions to recover on a claim
within the meaning of section 405(h) finds support in Elliott v. Weinberger.' 61
To reiterate,' Elliott involved a challenge to the procedures used in recouping
overpayments that were made in the administration of the Social Security
program. At the time Elliott was decided, the question of the propriety of
class actions and the availability of injunctive relief in section 405(g) litiga-
tion had not been definitively resolved. Partially to avoid this issue, the Ninth
Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to hear the claim presented based on
the federal mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361.'1' Nevertheless, before
reaching this conclusion, the court necessarily had to resolve the question
of whether federal mandamus jurisdiction (as contrasted with federal ques-
tion jurisdiction) was precluded by section 405(h). In concluding that SalfI
and section 405(h) did not preclude such jurisdiction, the appellate court
distinguished between challenges to substantive provisions and procedural
claims. The court wrote:
Nor are the present suits precluded by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) which con-
trols judicial actions to recover benefits. Weinberger v. Salfi interprets
§ 405(h) to require that claims for benefits be asserted only through 42 U.S.C.§ 405(g). The instant suits are quite different. They assert a constitutional
right to due process notice and hearing when alleged overpayments are
recouped. They are not claims for benefits. Nor would granting the relief
sought result in an entitlement to benefits. The distinction between due
process questions divorced from a claim for benefits and questions related
to the merits of a benefits claim is a significant one, requiring considerably
different treatment by the courts."'
Elliott concluded that because certain procedural claims simply were not
actions to recover on a claim within the meaning of section 405(h), federal
mandamus jurisdiction was not precluded.'7 3 Despite its logic, this conclu-
sion of Elliott is questionable. First, the same analysis leads to the conclu-
sion that federal question jurisdiction is available to entertain such procedural
claims. Yet, implicit in the Supreme Court's decision in Eldridge, which clear-
ly involved a procedural claim, was an indication that Salfi precluded federal
question jurisdiction over such claims.' 74 Although the Supreme Court in
Eldridge left the question of whether federal mandamus jurisdiction was
precluded by section 405(h) unanswered, 73 the Court gave no indication that
169. 564 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1977), aff'd sub nom. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979).
170. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
171. 564 F.2d at 1225 & n.8a.
172. Id. at 1226 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
173. Id. at 1226-27.
174. The Eldridge Court described its holding in Salf as "precluding federal-question jurisdic-
tion in an action challenging denial of claimed benefits." 424 U.S. at 327.
175. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 n.12 (1976).
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it did so because of the nature of the claim presented. Second, it was argued
in Salfi that the plaintiff did not seek recovery on a claim within the mean-
ing of section 405(h) because the relief requested was not tantamount to
a direct recovery of benefits. Specifically, Mrs. Salfi alleged that she would
need to resort to the administrative process to recover any benefits even if
the challenged statutory provision was found unconstitutional. '6 This argu-
ment was rejected by the Salfi Court.' Although Salfi admittedly did not
involve a procedural claim, the Court's rejection of Mrs. Salfi's argument makes
it unlikely that essentially the same argument would be accepted simply
because a procedural claim was involved.'78 Third, when factual matters are
in dispute, such as whether a claimant is disabled, it is not unusual for a
claimant to ask a federal district court to remand the question to the Secretary
for further consideration, rather than seeking an award of benefits.179 It is
doubtful, given the Supreme Court's reading of congressional intent in
Salfi,"0 that actions seeking such relief could be premised on section 1331.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that such actions do not fall within the
meaning of section 405(h) in that they do not explicitly seek an award of
benefits. Rather, a return to the administrative process is necessary before
any benefits can be awarded. Fourth, implicit in the argument accepted in
Elliott is the contention that some Social Security, S.S.I., and Medicare claims
can be premised on jurisdictional provisions other than section 405(g).
However, in concluding that federal district court jurisdiction to review a
Social Security claim was not available under the Federal Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, the Supreme Court in Califano v. Sanders'8 ' appeared to be
suggesting that section 405(g) was the exclusive jurisdictional vehicle to review
such claims. Such an interpretation leads to the conclusion that Social Securi-
ty, S.S.I., or Medicare claims cannot be premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or
28 U.S.C. § 1361 regardless of the nature of the relief sought.'
176. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 797-98 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Gain-
ville v. Richardson, 319 F. Supp. 16 (D. Mass. 1970)).
177. 422 U.S. at 756-59.
178. It should be noted that some procedural claims may seek to recover benefits. For exam-
ple, it would seem that the "procedural" claims presented in Eldridge and Elliott were suits
to recover on a claim because both Eldridge and Elliott wanted their benefits to continue pend-
ing an opportunity for an oral evidentiary hearing. Some procedural claims, however, might
not directly involve a claim for benefits. A claim that decisions are not being made with reasonable
promptness is an example of such a claim. See Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978).
Not surprisingly, whether a procedural claim is an action seeking to recover on a claim may
be dependent on the nature of the relief sought.
179. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976) specifically contemplates this course of conduct.
180. See supra text accompanying note 16.
181. 430 U.S. 99, 106 (1977).
182. It must be emphasized, however, that the specific holding of Sanders was that the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act is not a jurisdictional statute. Sanders did not specifically address
the question of whether § 405(g) was the exclusive jurisdictional vehicle to hear Social Security
claims. The concurring opinion of Justice Stewart, which Chief Justice Burger joined, reasoned
that there was no need to address the question of whether the Federal Administrative Pro-
cedure Act was a jurisdictional statute because § 405(g) was the sole jurisdictional basis for
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It appears that the preclusive effect of section 405(h) over procedural claims
cannot be avoided by arguing that such claims are not "actions to recover
on any claim." '183 Clearly, the ultimate aim of these procedural actions is
to recover benefits. Assuming the Salfi decision is correct, it is inconsistent
to say that Congress did not intend section 405(h) to cover such procedural
claims.
The related argument that constitutional challenges to Social Security,
S.S.I., and Medicare procedures do not arise under the respective programs
and, therefore, are not governed by section 405(h) is premised on language
found in Salfi. In rejecting the argument that federal question jurisdiction
was not precluded by section 405(h) because the action arose only under
the Constitution, the Salfi Court declared in part that the claim also arose
under the Social Security Act because the claimant sought to recover Social
Security benefits.' 8' Based upon this language, it has been argued that
constitutional'85 challenges to Social Security, S.S.I., or Medicare procedures
arise only under the Constitution, making section 405(h) inapplicable. 86 The
problem with this argument is that the Salfi Court did not rely solely on
the fact that the claimant sought to recover benefits in concluding that the
action arose under the Social Security Act. Rather, the Court also relied
on the fact that "it is the Social Security Act which provides both the stand-
ing and the substantive basis for the presentation of their constitutional
contentions."' 87 Because this latter rationale would apply to constitutional
challenges to Social Security or S.S.I. procedures, it is difficult to believe
that the Supreme Court would conclude that section 405(h) is inapplicable
to such claims because they arise only under the Constitution.
To summarize, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will find section 405(h)
inapplicable to constitutional or statutory challenges to Social Security, S.S.I.,
Social Security claims. 430 U.S. at 110-11 (Stewart, J., concurring). On the other hand, in
Califano v. Yamasaki, the Supreme Court noted that because jurisdiction was available under
§ 405(g), it saw no need to reach the question of whether mandamus jurisdiction otherwise
would be available. 442 U.S. 682, 698 (1979). See also Ellis v. Blum, 643 F.2d 68, 78 (2d
Cir. 1981) (finding mandamus jurisdiction available as an alternative to § 405(g) jurisdiction).
Yamasaki obviously indicates that the Supreme Court has not yet resolved the question of
whether § 405(g) is the exclusive jurisdictional vehicle to hear Social Security claims, at least
when jurisdiction is premised on the federal mandamus statute.
183. See, e.g., Humana of S. C., Inc. v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1070, 1080-81 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(a procedural claim unrelated to a denial of benefits not precluded by [§ 405(h)]); St. Louis
Univ. v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., 537 F.2d 283, 292 (8th Cir. 1976) (federal court's jurisdiction
over due process claim which sought to obtain a constitutionally adequate hearing not pre-
cluded by [§ 405(h)]), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976). But see Ellis v. Blum, 643 F.2d 68,
78-79 (2d Cir. 1981) (federal court's mandamus jurisdiction for procedural challenges in disability
suits not precluded by [§ 405(h)]).
184. 422 U.S. 749, 760-61 (1975).
185. Because statutory challenges to Social Security or S.S.I. procedures call for an inter-
pretation or application of a statutory provision, they clearly arise under the legislation establishing
the programs and not the Constitution.
186. See LEVIN, supra note 27, 2-8 n.91.
187. 422 U.S. at 760-61.
1982]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
or Medicare procedures either because such challenges are not actions to
recover on a claim or because they do not arise under the programs. The
practical significance of this conclusion, however, is minimized by the
Supreme Court decisions following Salfi which deal with the section 405(g)
final decision requirement and by the Court's holding in Yamasaki with
regard to class actions and injunctive relief.
Mandamus Jurisdiction
In Eldridge, Norton v. Mathews,'85 and Yamasaki, the Supreme Court
left unanswered the question of whether mandamus jurisdiction is available
in challenges to provisions of the Social Security, S.S.I., and Medicare legisla-
tion and implementing regulations. The practical importance of this ques-
tion and the question of whether other alternatives to section 405(g) jurisdic-
tion exist depend on the problems of litigating such claims under section
405(g).' 89
In assessing the availability of federal mandamus jurisdiction, the ques-
tion of whether section 405(g) is the exclusive jurisdictional vehicle for Social
Security, S.S.I., and certain Medicare claims should be kept separate from
the question of whether mandamus jurisdiction is available given the specific
nature of the claim. In addressing the propriety of federal mandamus jurisdic-
tion over Social Security, S.S.I., and Medicare claims, one must first deter-
mine whether section 405(h) precludes any jurisdictional vehicle other than
section 405(g) and, then assuming it does not, determine whether federal
mandamus jurisdiction is appropriate given the nature of'the claim."'
With regard to whether section 405(g) is the exclusive jurisdictional vehi-
cle to resolve Social Security claims, the Supreme Court in Califano v.
Sanders had implied as much for essentially two reasons. First, in explain-
ing why section 405(g) jurisdiction was available in Salfi and Eldridge, the
Sanders Court noted that a federal forum would not have been available
to review the constitutional claims presented absent section 405(g)
jurisdiction. 9' By definition, then, the Sanders Court apparently believed
188. 427 U.S. 524 (1976). See supra note 157.
189. For example, as has been noted, the Ninth Circuit in Elliott chose to premise jurisdic-
tion on 28 U.S.C. § 1361, the federal mandamus statute, because the question of the propriety
of class actions and the availability of injunctive relief in § 405(g) litigation was unresolved.
See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text. After Yamasaki, however, the importance of
the federal mandamus statute as a jurisdictional vehicle in social welfare legislation cases is
primarily dependent upon the difficulty of satisfying the § 405(g) final decision requirement
and, more specifically, its nonwaivable element. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
The feasibility of the federal mandamus statute as a jurisdictional vehicle is also dependent
on any problems engendered by the sixty-day statute of limitations, especially in the class action
context.
190. See supra note 25.
191. 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977). It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court in Eldridge
specifically left unanswered the question of whether federal mandamus jurisdiction would be
available to review Social Security claims. 424 U.S. 319, 332 n.12 (1976). Sanders was decided
after Eldridge.
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that federal mandamus jurisdiction would not have been available to resolve
the claims presented in Salfi and Eldridge. Second, in resolving whether the
federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA)'92 was a jurisdictional statute,
the Sanders Court assessed the significance of Congress' action in 1976 in
removing the jurisdictional amount requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 1331193 in
actions brought against federal officials in their official capacity and the
significance of Congress' concomitant retention of section 405(h). The Court
emphasized that, given the removal of the jurisdictional amount requirement,
it would make little sense to conclude that Congress intended the APA to
be jurisdictional because its practical significance would be limited to situa-
tions involving federal officials where federal question jurisdiction was
unavailable, such as, perhaps, in Social Security claims.' 94 But, the Court
believed that such a conclusion was unlikely because Congress retained sec-
tion 405(h) when it deleted the jurisdictional amount requirement.' 9" Thus,
implicit in the Sanders Court's conclusion that the federal APA was not
a jurisdictional statute because of the 1976 amendments to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331(a), and the retention of section 405(h), is the belief that Congress in-
tended all Social Security claims to be governed by section 405(g). If such
was the case, federal mandamus jurisdiction over Social Security, S.S.I., and
Medicare claims would not be available.
Despite the Court's comments in Sanders, federal appellate courts subse-
quent to Yamasaki have not necessarily concluded that mandamus jurisdic-
tion is unavailable for Social Security, S.S.I., and Medicare claims. Perhaps
the most scholarly treatment of the question of the availability of federal
mandamus jurisdiction over Social Security, S.S.I., and Medicare claims has
been Judge Friendly's opinion for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
Ellis v. Blum. 96 The claimant in Ellis alleged that the procedures used in
terminating Social Security disability benefits by the Social Security Ad-
ministration and the state agency administering the program were constitu-
tionally deficient because terminations were not preceded by a written notice
containing a summary of the evidence justifying the proposed termination
and an explanation of why the recipient was no longer considered to be
disabled.'97 Mrs. Ellis premised federal district court jurisdiction for her claim
on 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1361. As to section 405(g)
jurisdiction, the Secretary argued that the final decision requirement had not
been satisfied because, at the time the complaint was filed, Mrs. Ellis' benefits
had not actually been terminated despite several pretermination notices.
192. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976). The Administrative Procedure Act provides that a person
who is wronged by an agency action is generally entitled to judicial review.
193. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976).
194. 430 U.S. at 106-07.
195. The Court stated: "Congress' explicit entry into the jurisdictional area counsels against
our reading the APA as an implied jurisdictional grant designed solely to fill such an interstitial
gap in § 1331 jurisdiction." Id. at 107.
196. 643 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1981).
197. Id. at 71.
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Although Judge Friendly recognized that the Supreme Court in Eldridge had
indicated that the final decision requirement should not be construed so as
to nullify collateral claims, he stated that the Court was reluctant to find
section 405(g) jurisdiction when no decision to terminate benefits had been
made.' 8 The appellate court, consequently, chose not to resolve the ques-
tion of whether section 405(g) jurisdiction was available to resolve Mrs. Ellis'
claim. 1" As to section 1331 jurisdiction, the claimant argued that section
405(h) did not preclude federal question jurisdiction over constitutional pro-
cedural challenges which did not directly seek to recover benefits.2"' Judge
Friendly indicated that the Second Circuit was inclined to agree with this
argument notwithstanding the Eldridge and Sanders decisions.20 ' Nevertheless,
the court stopped short of doing so, and, as it did with its decision regard-
ing section 405(g) jurisdiction, it chose not to resolve this question.
The Ellis court found it unnecessary to resolve the section 405(g) and sec-
tion 1331 jurisdictional questions because it concluded that jurisdiction was
available under the federal mandamus statute.2 °0 In so doing, the court re-
jected the argument implicit in Sanders"3 that section 405(g) was the ex-
clusive jurisdictional vehicle to resolve Social Security claims. 0 4 First, Judge
Friendly noted that, whereas the Court in Sanders read the legislative history
concerning the removal of the jurisdictional amount requirement as
demonstrating a congressional belief that the federal APA was not a jurisdic-
tional statute, the legislative history concerning the interaction between
removal of the jurisdictional amount requirement and the federal mandamus
statute dictated the opposite conclusion. 0 ' Specifically, the evidence indicated
that Congress intended for the federal mandamus statute to supplement sec-
tion 1331,06 thereby filling the jurisdictional gaps that according to the
Sanders Court, Congress did not intend the APA to fill. 07 Second, with
regard to the significance of section 405(h), Judge Friendly pointed out that
at the time it was enacted in 1939, the District Court of the District of Col-
umbia had the authority to issue writs of mandamus against federal officials,
and there was no indication that Congress intended to preclude the court
198. Id. at 77. The claimant argued that the § 405(g) final decision had been made with
regard to the procedures utilized in terminating disability benefits. The claimant, in part, sought
damages for injuries allegedly resulting from the use of the constitutionally defective procedures.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 77-78. See St. Louis Univ. v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., 537 F.2d 283 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976).
201. The Second Circuit apparently agreed with the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that "Salfi
did not preclude § 1331 jurisdiction over procedural challenges not necessarily affecting entitle-
ment to benefits." 643 F.2d at 77.
202. Id.
203. Note in particular the concurring opinion of Justice Stewart in Sanders. 430 U.S. at
110 (Stewart, J., concurring).
204. 643 F.2d at 78-81.
205. Id. at 80. See H.R. REP. No. 1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1976); S. REP. No.
966, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1976).
206. 643 F.2d at 80-81.
207. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
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from continuing that practice when it enacted § 405(h). Further, he observed
that when 28 U.S.C. § 1361 was passed in 1962, granting federal district
courts nationwide the authority to issue writs of mandamus, there was no
indication that Congress intended for this grant of federal mandamus jurisdic-
tion to be subject to the limitations of section 405(h).2"8 Finally, Judge Friend-
ly concluded that even if section 405(h) was read generally to preclude federal
mandamus jurisdiction over Social Security claims, it would not be dispositive
of the present case because the action was not one to recover on a claim.
Thus, it did not come within the purview of section 405(h).2 °9
Although the Ellis court found that federal mandamus jurisdiction was
available, it was careful to limit its holding to claims that are essentially
procedural in nature.2" ' This limited holding illustrates that the availability
of federal mandamus jurisdiction over Social Security, S.S.I., or Medicare
claims is dependent upon the nature of the claim. The question of which
claims are appropriate for federal mandamus jurisdiction is not unique to
Social Security, S.S.I., or Medicare litigation and is beyond the scope of
this Article. To the extent one can generalize, federal mandamus jurisdic-
tion should be available for statutory challenges to procedural or substan-
tive regulations promulgated to implement the aforementioned entitlement
programs. These actions should come within the "ministerial" limitation of
federal mandamus jurisdiction.2 ' Federal mandamus jurisdiction also should
be available for constitutional challenges to statutory provisions and regula-
tions of a procedural nature.2"2 It is doubtful, however, that federal man-
damus jurisdiction will be available for constitutional challenges to statutory
provisions or regulations of a substantive nature." 3
208. Id. at 81. See also Elliott v. Weinberger, 564 F.2d 1219, 1227 n.12 (9th Cir. 1977)
(§ 1361 jurisdiction not precluded by § 405(h)), aff'd sub nom. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442
U.S 682 (1979).
209. 643 F.2d at 82. The Court then in the context of its discussion of federal mandamus
jurisdiction accepted the argument that it found persuasive, but saw no need to definitively
address, in the context of federal question jurisdiction. Interestingly, the Court recognized that
it could be argued that the action was one to recover on a claim because the complaint in
part did seek reinstatement of benefits for those class members whose benefits had been ter-
minated without receiving'a constitutionally adequate pretermination notice. However, the Court
indicated that it did not believe that this was the kind of recovery Congress had in mind when
it adopted § 405(h). Id. It should be emphasized, however, that given the somewhat unique
fact that Mrs. Ellis was still receiving her disability benefits at the time the action was filed,
it clearly cannot be said that her individual action was one to recover on a claim within the
meaning of § 405(h).
210. Id.
211. See supra note 25.
212. See, e.g., White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977) (mandamus appropriate for
reviewing delays in processing disability claims), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Ryan v.
Shea, 525 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1975) (mandamus jurisdiction appropriate for challenge to S.S.I.
notice and hearing provisions); Elliott v. Weinberger, 371 F. Supp. 960 (D. Hawaii 1974) (man-
damus jurisdiction for challenge to recoupment of old age and disability benefits appropriate
where no other adequate remedy exists).
213. See Winningham v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 512 F.2d 617 (5th
Cir. 1975).
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The availability of federal mandamus jurisdiction over Social Security,
S.S.I., or Medicare claims has yet to be resolved by the Supreme Court.
Given the decisions in Diaz and Yamasaki, however, practically this issue
is most likely to arise in cases similar to Ellis, in which there is difficulty
in satisfying the section 405(g) final decision requirement.
Retroactive Benefits
The availability of retroactive benefits to the named plaintiffs and affected
class members in Social Security, S.S.I., and Medicare litigation is a ques-
tion of obvious significance. Particularly with regard to a constitutional or
statutory challenge to program regulations and procedures over which the
Secretary has control, there is little incentive for the Secretary to reconsider
the propriety of his policies if an award of retroactive benefits is not
available.1 4 An award of retroactive benefits also will act to insure that
claimants receive all benefits to which they are legally entitled.
The availability of retroactive benefits essentially involves two questions:
(1) whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes such an award;
and, (2) assuming that it does not, whether such an award should be pre-
cluded because any judicial decision in favor of a claimant should only be
applied prospectively."'
The Supreme Court has not yet resolved the question of the availability
of retroactive benefits in Social Security, S.S.I., or Medicare litigation." '
In Califano v. Boles'" and Califano v. Aznavorian, ' 8 lower courts had struck
down statutory provisions on constitutional grounds and had awarded retroac-
tive benefits. In both cases, the Supreme Court reversed on the merits, thereby
making it unnecessary to address the issue, which had also been raised on
appeal, of the availability of retroactive benefits."'
A recent appellate court decision addressing this question is Wright v.
Califano2 Wright involved a constitutional challenge to a provision of the
214. The Secretary, however, may feel some compulsion to do so based on his obligation
to act consistently with the Constitution. The prospect of a significant award of attorney's
fees to the claimant's attorney if the claimant prevails also may have a considerable impact
on the Secretary's actions.
215. Lassow, supra note 3, at 916-17.
216. The Court in Richardson v. Griffin, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972), did summarily affirm a
three-judge district court order finding a provision of the Social Security legislation unconstitu-
tional and ordered payments of improperly withheld benefits. See Griffin v. Richardson, 346
F. Supp. 1226, 1237 (D. Md.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972). The precedential value of summary
affirmances, however, is debatable. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71, reh'g denied,
416 U.S. 1000 (1974).
217. 464 F. Supp. 408, 418 (W.D. Tex. 1978). In Boles, the district court ordered the Secretary
to make retroactive payments only to the named plaintiffs. It also required notice to class
members that they were no longer ineligible for benefits because of the challenged provision. Id.
218. 440 F. Supp. 788, 803 (S.D. Cal. 1977). The Aznavorian court drew no distinction
between the named plaintiffs and class members with regard to retroactive relief.
219. See Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 296-97 (1979); Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S.
170, 174 (1978).
220. 603 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980).
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Social Security legislation which required a husband seeking benefits based
upon his wife's eligibility for old age or disability benefits to establish that
he was receiving at least one-half of his support from his wife. Wives seek-
ing similar benefits were not required to satisfy this support requirement.
The district court held the challenged statutory provision to be unconstitu-
tional. The court ordered the Secretary to pay retroactive benefits to those
individuals who were denied benefits because of the challenged statutory pro-
vision and for whom a final decision was made on or after sixty days prior
to the date the class action complaint was filed.22 ' On appeal to the Seventh
Circuit, the Secretary argued that the district court's award was precluded
by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and, in the alternative, that the district
court's decision on the merits should only have been applied prospectively.
222
In considering the sovereign immunity argument, the Seventh Circuit
recognized that although the district court had jurisdiction under section
405(g) to resolve the plaintiff's claim, that, in and of itself, did not mean
that a retroactive monetary award against the Secretary was not precluded
by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.223 Rather, to determine whether
sovereign immunity precluded such an award the court looked to whether
the specific relief sought had been authorized by a federal statute.22 The
Seventh Circuit found authorization for a retroactive monetary award in three
separate statutory provisions. First, the court noted that section 405(g)
specifically authorized a district court to enter a judgment reversing the deci-
sion of the Secretary. Second, the court pointed out that 42 U.S.C. § 404
mandated that the Secretary make payment of any monies owing to a clai-
mant who had received less than the correct amount due him. 225 Finally,
the court emphasized that 42 U.S.C. § 4026) provided that those "who would
have been entitled to benefits under sections 402(a)-(g) or (h)" of the Social
Security legislation were eligible for retroactive benefits for a one year period,
provided they were eligible in all other respects.226 Taken together, the court
held that these provisions indicated Congress' "unequivocal" intent to in-
sure that claimants received both retroactive and prospective benefits.
2 17
221. Id. at 668-69 nn.5 & 7.
222. Id. at 670-73.
223. See United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976) (this conclusion recognizes that the
concepts of jurisdiction and relief involve separate concerns). See also Davis v. Passman, 442
U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979) (jurisdiction concerns power of court to hear case; cause of action
involves whether any private party may invoke court's power; standing involves whether par-
ticular individual has right to invoke court's power; relief encompasses various remedies court
may make available).
224. 603 F.2d at 670-72.
225. An analogous provision for the S.S.I. program can be found at 42 U.S.C. § 1383(b)
(1976).
226. This was the case now for the plaintiffs given the court's decision. 603 F.2d at 671.
Lassow, supra note 3, 917 n.138, suggests that 42 U.S.C. § 4050) also authorizes an award
of monetary retroactive benefits.
227. 603 F.2d at 671-72. See Cash v. Califano, 621 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1980) (court, citing
Wright, found that doctrine of sovereign immunity did not preclude award of retroactive benefits).
See also Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 702 (7th Cir. 1975) (§ 405(g) itself operates
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Notwithstanding the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of congressional in-
tent in Wright, it is arguably unclear that the statutory language relied on
supports a finding that Congress intended to waive sovereign immunity and
to award benefits retroactively in Social Security litigation, at least as to
class members. Three federal appellate court decisions have implied as much:
Johnson v. Mathews, 28 Tatum v. Mathews,29 and De Lao v. Califano.23 °
Each was a class action which involved a due process challenge to the pro-
cedures used in terminating the benefits of certain S.S.I. disability recipients.2 '
In each case, the appellate court held that the challenged practice, which
permitted the termination of benefits without an opportunity for a prior
evidentiary hearing, violated due process. In none of these cases, however,
were the courts willing to enter an award requiring the payment of benefits
to claimants for monies withheld from the date of termination until a hear-
ing was held. The courts reached this conclusion because they were unable
to find any federal statutory authorization for an award of retroactive
payments. 32 Accordingly, they were unable to find any waiver of sovereign
immunity. Unlike Wright, the courts in Johnson, Tatum, and De Lao found
that nothing in section 405(g), as it concerns the S.S.I. program or the en-
abling legislation, indicated Congress' intent to waive sovereign immunity.233
Interestingly, the courts concluded that sovereign immunity would not bar
retroactive payments to claimants who were successful at post-termination
hearings because such an award of back benefits was arguably authorized
by statute.3 For those found ineligible, however, the courts concluded that
as a waiver of sovereign immunity because it authorizes actions to recover benefits wrongfully
withheld), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
228. 539 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir. 1976).
229. 541 F.2d 161 (6th Cir. 1976).
230. 560 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1977).
231. Johnson, 539 F.2d at 1114-15; Tatum, 541 F.2d at 163; De Lao, 560 F.2d at 1386-87.
Recipients of state disability benefits as of December, 1973, who also had received benefits
for one month prior to July, 1973, were automatically grandfathered into the S.S.I. program
when the program began on January 1, 1974. The eligibility of such individuals was not deter-
mined based on federal disability standards as set out in the S.S.I. enabling legislation. In-
dividuals who had received state disability benefits as of December, 1973, but who had not
received benefits for one month prior to July, 1973, were also initially grandfathered into the
S.S.I. program. On December 31, 1973, however, Congress amended the S.S.I. legislation and
mandated that the eligibility of this latter group of individuals was to be determined based
upon federal disability standards. Given the logistical problems of immediately determining the
eligibility of such individuals, Congress authorized the Secretary to treat such individuals as
presumptively eligible for benefits for one year, through December 31, 1974, or until a deter-
mination of their eligibility was made. If a negative determination was made, the Secretary
terminated benefits without any opportunity for a prior evidentiary hearing. It was this prac-
tice which was challenged.
232. See De Lao, 560 F.2d at 1390-91; Tatum, 541 F.2d at 165-66; Johnson, 539 F.2d at
1122-25.
233. See, e.g., De Lao, 560 F.2d at 1390 (citing Johnson, 539 F.2d at 1123); Tatum, 541
F.2d at 166 (citing Johnson, 539 F.2d at 1123); Johnson, 539 F.2d at 1123.
234. De Lao, 560 F.2d at 1391; Tatum, 541 F.2d at 166 n.5; Johnson, 539 F.2d at 1125.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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an award of benefits for the period during which they were unconstitutionally
deprived of benefits was barred by the sovereign immunity doctrine."'
It is difficult to reconcile Johnson, De Lao, and Tatum with Wright. 36
The Wright court attempted to do so by noting that Congress' express in-
tent would be ignored if retroactive benefits were paid in Johnson, De Lao,
and Tatum because some payments would be made to individuals who
ultimately were found ineligible." 7 Yet, it clearly was not Congress' intent
to pay retroactive benefits to individuals similarly situated to the claimant
in Wright.238 The Wright court also emphasized that those ultimately found
eligible through the administrative process in Johnson, De Lao, and Tatum
would be entitled to back benefits pursuant to a statutory provision. 39 This
would appear to be of little relevance, however, in determining whether a
judicial award of retroactive benefits is precluded by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. Perhaps the better reconciliation of Wright with Johnson, De Lao,
and Tatum is to recognize that the claimants who were unsuccessful at the
post-termination hearings involved in the latter three cases were not damaged
by the challenged actions. The same might be said of the claimants in Wright
if it was established on remand that they were ineligible for benefits for
reasons unconnected with the challenged statutory provisions. This explana-
tion, of course, is of little help in resolving the sovereign immunity issue.
Ultimately, of course, the sovereign immunity question is one of congres-
sional intent. It must be determined whether Congress desired to preclude
retroactive monetary relief in Social Security, S.S.I., and Medicare litiga-
tion. As the above discussion illustrates, the answer to this question is not
clear. To the extent that a clear expression of congressional intent is re-
quired before a finding of a waiver of sovereign immunity is appropriate,
the precedential value of Wright may be suspect.
Interestingly, the decisions in Johnson, De Lao, and Tatum may minimize
the practical significance of the sovereign immunity question. In each of
these cases, the appellate court determined that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity would not preclude an award of retroactive benefits if the claimants
established their eligibility at a post-termination hearing. Analogously, it could
be argued that the doctrine of sovereign immunity would not preclude an
award of retroactive benefits if a court did not order such an award, but
simply required the Secretary to notify all affected class members of the
court's finding that a statutory provision or regulation was unconstitutional.240
235. Johnson, 539 F.2d at 1125; Tatum, 541 F.2d at 166; De Lao, 560 F.2d at 1391.
236. See supra note 227.
237. Wright, 603 F.2d at 672 n.16.
238. It could be argued that this is not necessarily the case for if Congress had known that
treating Mr. Wright differently from a similarly situated wife would be unconstitutional, it
might have determined his eligibility for benefits in the same manner that eligibility of a wife
was determined.
239. Id. See also supra note 226 and accompanying text.
240. There may be some question of whether requiring the Secretary to give such notice
to affected class members is precluded by the doctrine of sovereign immunity because to do
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If these individuals, after notification, then sought benefits and were suc-
cessful, it could be argued that, even given the decisions in Johnson, De
Lao, and Tatum, the doctrine of sovereign immunity would not foreclose
an award of retroactive benefits.
A federal district court utilized this reasoning in Aznavorian v. Califano'"
to justify a decision that ultimately could have led to an award of retro-
active benefits. In Aznavorian, the court, after finding a provision of the
S.S.I. legislation unconstitutional, indicated that claimants who later were
able to establish their eligibility in light of the court's decision would be
entitled to retroactive benefits notwithstanding the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. 2 2 If this rationale is correct, the barrier of sovereign immunity
will result only in the delay, and not a complete denial, of the receipt of
retroactive benefits.2 4 3 A reading of Johnson, De Lao, Tatum, and Az-
navorian then implies that a court may permissibly order the Secretary to
reconsider a claimant's eligibility after a finding that the claimant has been
illegally denied benefits, which reconsideration may result in back payments.
However, a court may not simply order the payment of retroactive benefits
upon a finding that a claimant was denied benefits because of an unconstitu-
tional statutory provision. The difficulty with this analysis is that, in both
situations, the judiciary is mandating the expenditure of funds from the public
treasury to redress past wrongs-a direct order that traditionally has been
barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.24 4 Arguably, absent an affirma-
tive finding of a waiver of sovereign immunity, such a result should not
be permitted. To this extent, the sovereign immunity question presented in
Johnson, De Lao, Tatum, Aznavorian, and Wright should be the same: Did
Congress intend to authorize an award of retroactive monetary benefits? This
should be the dispositive question rather than the question suggested by
Aznavorian-whether a judicial decision explicitly requires such an award
or only implicitly does so.
It also must be noted that in certain situations, even in the absence of
a waiver, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is inapplicable. In Dugan v.
Rank,245 the Supreme Court indicated that the doctrine was inapplicable to
proceedings alleging that the actions of a federal officer were either outside
his statutory authority or unconstitutional. In Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp. ,246 however, the Supreme Court, in addressing the sovereign
immunity issue, wrote in a footnote:
so requires affirmative action by the Secretary. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 691 n. 11(1949). But see Granquist, "Sovereign Immunity: Compounded
Confusion Continued," 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 192, 192-93 (July 1979).
241. 440 F. Supp. 788 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 439 U.S. 170, 177-78 (1978).
242. Id. at 803. This same rationale could be used in the context of the eleventh amendment
barrier to an award of retroactive benefits with regard to entitlement programs operated by
the states.
243. See Lassow, supra note 3, at 917.
244. See supra note 240.
245. 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
246. 337 U.S. 682, 691 n.1l (1949).
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Of course, a suit may fail, as one against the sovereign, even if it is claimed
that the officer being sued has acted unconstitutionally or beyond his
statutory powers, if the relief requested cannot be granted by merely order-
ing the cessation of the conduct complained of but will require affirmative
action by the sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably sovereign
property.2 7
The Seventh Circuit in Wright apparently saw no need to reconcile Larson
with Dugan because the court found an affirmative waiver of sovereign im-
munity within the Social Security legislation. Consequently, there was no
need to identify the circumstances under which the doctrine of sovereign
immunity would be applicable to claims challenging the actions of federal
officers on constitutional or federal statutory grounds. This precise question
was addressed in Johnson and De Lao.
In Johnson, the Eighth Circuit noted that the Larson footnote had been
the subject of considerable controversy. 2"" The Johnson court concluded that
the footnote significantly modified Dugan and precluded an award of retro-
active benefits because to require such an award "would require affirmative
action to produce essentially compensatory rather than remedial payments."2 '9
Given the Johnson court's reading of the Larson footnote, absent a waiver,
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, at least in the Eighth Circuit, will con-
tinue to pose a significant barrier to an award of retroactive monetary relief
in actions alleging that federal officials have acted in violation of a federal
statute or the Constitution.
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit in De Lao interpreted the Larson footnote
differently than the Johnson court. The De Lao court concluded that the
Larson language that "a suit may fail" did not mean that a suit challenging
the action of federal officials must fail.25 To determine whether sovereign
immunity should cause a suit to fail, the court held that the crucial inquiry
in proceedings challenging the actions of federal officials on statutory or
constitutional grounds was whether the "relief sought would work an in-
tolerable burden on the government which outweighs any considerations of
private harm." 25 ' The De Lao court, in applying what is essentially a balanc-
ing approach, concluded that because retroactive benefits would be available
to those individuals found eligible after an administrative hearing, the addi-
tional requirement of payment to those found to be ineligible after a hear-
ing would work an intolerable burden on the government, which would
outweigh any consideration of private harm.252
247. Id.
248. 539 F.2d 1111, 1124 (8th Cir. 1976).
249. Id. at 1124 n.21.
250. 560 F.2d 1384, 1391 (9th Cir. 1977).
251. Id. See also Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310, 1317-18 (9th Cir. 1969) (doctrine
of sovereign immunity inapplicable because relief sought did not impose intolerable burden
on governmental functions).
252. 560 F.2d at 1391. Lassow suggests that where S.S.I. benefits are at issue, because they
are based on need, an award of retroactive benefits might be warranted under the De Lao
approach. Lassow, supra note 3, at 917.
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Given the decisions in Johnson and De Lao, and assuming that there has
been no waiver of sovereign immunity, the initial question, in light of Lar-
son, in determining whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity will preclude
certain relief is whether the relief sought "will require affirmative action
by the sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably sovereign property." 253
Assuming this to be the case, if De Lao is followed and if the remedy re-
quested is found not to impose an intolerable burden on the government
that outweighs any private harm, then sovereign immunity will not preclude
the requested relief irrespective of any waiver.
The De Lao approach to the sovereign immunity issue obviously involves
a balancing of the equities. Some of the considerations which should be
weighed in this process include whether an award of retroactive benefits is
needed to deter improper governmental conduct; whether such an award is
consistent with the purposes of the legislation; and whether such an award
would impose a substantial administrative burden on the government.
Assuming an award of retroactive benefits is not precluded by sovereign
immunity either because of a waiver or because the defense is inapplicable,
it still must be determined whether a judicial decision should only be ap-
plied prospectively. If only prospective application is warranted, then irrespec-
tive of sovereign immunity, retroactive monetary relief will not be available.
In Wright, the Seventh Circuit briefly addressed the question of whether
a lower court decision should only be applied prospectively, thereby precluding
an award of retroactive monetary relief. The appellate court implicitly
recognized254 that the leading Supreme Court decision addressing this issue
is Chevron Oil Co. v. Hudson.2" In Chevron Oil, the Supreme Court focused
on whether it is appropriate to apply a judicial decision to conduct that
arose prior to the decision. The Court stated:
In our cases dealing with the nonretroactivity question, we have generally
considered three separate factors. First, the decision to be applied
nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling
clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding
an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.
Second, it has been stressed that "we must . . . weigh the merits and
demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in ques-
tion, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will fur-
ther or retard its operation." Finally, we have weighed the inequity im-
posed by retroactive application, for "[w]here a decision of this Court
could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there
is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice or hardship' by a
holding of nonretroactivity."2''
253. Larson, 337 U.S. at 691 n.11. As the Johnson court noted, some courts have avoided
the broader implications of the Larson footnote by concluding that the relief being sought
was not "affirmative in nature" because cessation of unauthorized conduct was the object
of the suit. 539 F.2d at 1124. See State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir.
1973) (relief requiring government officials to cease unauthorized action is not affirmative relief);
Knox Hill Tenant Council v. Washington, 448 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
254. 603 F.2d 666, 672 n.17 (1979).
255. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
256. Id. at 106-07 (citations omitted).
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The Wright court determined that an application of Chevron Oil did not
preclude an award of retroactive benefits. '57 The court reached this conclu-
sion not because it believed that an application of the previously identified
factors dictated this result, but rather because it believed that, given the facts
of the case, such an award would not involve a retroactive application of
a judicial decision. Specifically, Wright found that if the class had been prop-
erly certified, all those seeking benefits would have been in court at the time
the decision which favorably resolved the plaintiff's substantive claim was
decided. Implicit in this conclusion is the idea that the application of a judicial
decision to a pending claim does not necessarily involve a retroactive ap-
plication of that decision. 8 Although the logic of this conclusion may be
debatable depending upon the relief sought, the real question when retroac-
tivity is an issue, which question was not directly addressed in Wright, is
how the considerations enunciated in Chevron Oil should be applied in deter-
mining whether a judicial decision in favor of a class of claimants should
be applied retroactively.
These considerations were applied by former Circuit Court Judge Stevens
for the Seventh Circuit in Jimenez v. Weinberger.'" He first noted that,
given the nature of the claim26 and the lack of an authoritative Supreme
Court decision at the time the case was filed, the first consideration-whether
the decision established a new principle of law-suggested a nonretroactive
result. Interestingly, he also noted that when the substantive issue presented
is the constitutionality of a statutory provision over which the Secretary is
powerless, the first Chevron Oil consideration would always suggest a
nonretroactive result. He apparently believed this to be true because the
Secretary is required to administer federal statutes as written until ordered
otherwise. As a result, judicial decisions which cast doubt on the propriety
of a particular practice should not be significant in determining whether a
nonretroactive result is warranted.26" ' Notwithstanding this logic, when judicial
decisions indicate significant constitutional problems with a particular prac-
tice, a retroactive result may be warranted in order to prompt Congress to
change statutory provisions which have obvious constitutional defects.2 62
Although the Jimenez court concluded that the first Chevron Oil factor
suggested a nonretroactive result, it concluded that a retroactive result was
warranted in light of the remaining two considerations. Specifically, the court
257. Wright v. Califano, 603 F.2d 666, 672 n.17 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S.
911 (1980).
258. Id. at 672 n.17.
259. 523 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
260. Jimenez involved a constitutional challenge to provisions of the Social Security legisla-
tion which arguably discriminated against illegitimate children.
261. Id. at 703. If the challenge is to a regulation or procedure then this logic would not
be applicable.
262. In Cash v. Califano, 621 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1980), and in Novak v. Harris, 504 F.
Supp. 101, 103-04 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), the courts concluded that the first Chevron Oil considera-
tion justified a retroactive result even though the constitutionality of a statutory provision was
at issue.
1982]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
noted that retroactive awards are likely to be consistent with the purposes
of the Social Security legislation and seemingly are mandated by those pro-
visions of the legislation authorizing a recovery of underpayments.263 The
Jimenez court further emphasized that retroactive application of its decision
would not diminish benefits to current recipients or create administrative
havoc. 6" In considering the third factor set forth in Chevron Oil, the court
stressed that the burden is on the Secretary to establish that a retroactive
application of a judicial decision would produce substantial inequities.2"5
The approach suggested in Jimenez for determining whether a judicial deci-
sion should be applied only prospectively was followed, with one significant
exception, by the Fourth Circuit in Cash v. Califano. I The issue in Cash
was whether the Supreme Court's decision in Califano v. Goldfarb should
be applied retroactively.26 In concluding that it should, the court went one
step further than the Jimenez court, and found that all three of the con-
siderations set forth in Chevron Oil mandated retroactive payments.
Specifically, unlike the Jimenez court, the Cash court held that the fact that
the constitutionality of a statutory provision was at issue did not preclude
a retroactive application of a judicial decision if the case was not of first
impression, did not involve a complete reversal of prior law, and other judicial
decisions existed which put the Secretary on notice that the decision at issue
might be forthcoming.26
Although the question of the retroactive application of a judicial decision
invariably will involve a balancing of a number of considerations in the con-
text of a particular case, given the reasoning in Cash and Jimenez, this balan-
cing, unlike the sovereign immunity question, should not pose a significant
barrier to an award of retroactive benefits.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court decision in Salfi raised the spectre that there would
be a number of significant procedural obstacles in federal court litigation
involving challenges to provisions of Social Security, S.S.I., and Medicare
legislation and regulations implementing this legislation. Judicial decisions
subsequent to Salfi, however, have substantially lessened the concerns that
were expressed by representatives of program beneficiaries. These decisions
263. 523 F.2d at 703. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 404, 1383(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
264. 523 F.2d at 704. See also Califano v. Aznavorian, 440 F. Supp. 788, 800-02 (S.D. Cal.
1977) (court noted that if retroactive relief was denied because of increased administrative costs
alone, the government would never be compelled to repay benefits to which recipients were
later found entitled), rev'd, 439 U.S. 170 (1978).
265. 523 F.2d at 704.
266. 621 F.2d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1980).
267. Id. at 628. See supra note 262. The claimant in Cash had filed a claim with the Social
Security Administration. The Administration refused to apply Goldfarb retroactively, relying
on the fact that the Supreme Court had not specifically ruled that Goldfarb was to be applied
retroactively. 621 F.2d at 628.
268. Id. at 630.
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are especially significant in light of the likelihood of a restructuring in the
Social Security program. To the extent that any restructuring results in signifi-
cant changes affecting program benefits and beneficiaries, it is inevitable that
these changes will be challenged in the federal courts, most often in class-
oriented litigation. Although many procedural obstacles will be encountered
in such litigation, the majority of these barriers should not prove to be in-
surmountable. The most difficult one to overcome undoubtedly will be the
assertion that sovereign immunity precludes an award of retroactive benefits
to claimants in federal court litigation.

